Al-Baghdadi and the Art of Terrorist Persuasion by Dawshi, Bandar
The University of Southern Mississippi 
The Aquila Digital Community 
Dissertations 
Fall 12-1-2020 
Al-Baghdadi and the Art of Terrorist Persuasion 
Bandar Dawshi 
Follow this and additional works at: https://aquila.usm.edu/dissertations 
Recommended Citation 
Dawshi, Bandar, "Al-Baghdadi and the Art of Terrorist Persuasion" (2020). Dissertations. 1850. 
https://aquila.usm.edu/dissertations/1850 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by The Aquila Digital Community. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of The Aquila Digital Community. For more 
information, please contact Joshua.Cromwell@usm.edu. 
 
 





Bandar Jaber Dawshi 
A Dissertation 
Submitted to the Graduate School, 
the College of Arts and Sciences 
and the School of Communication 
at The University of Southern Mississippi 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
Approved by: 
 
Dr. John Meyer, Committee Chair 
Dr. Robert Pauly 
Dr. Eura Jung 
Dr. Laurance Strait 
















Bandar Jaber Dawshi 
2020 







This dissertation examines the rhetoric used by ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi 
to persuade thousands of young Muslims around the world to join the organization and 
defend it until the end. The dissertation concerns the innovative methods used by the 
organization to reach thousands of young people around the world, and the role of 
misinterpretations of the Qur'an in supporting al-Baghdadi's rhetorical arguments. In 
order to provide a reasonable explanation for these speeches, the dissertation used 
Aristotle's rhetorical methodology, Gamal Abdel Nasser's rhetorical concept, Burke's 
concept of identity and social identity theory. The arguments focused on studying 
rhetoric within the Isis organization, particularly the rhetorical methods of al-Baghdadi, 
and analyzing the persuasive elements in the extremist discourse. Four speeches of ISIS 
leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi were selected for analysis. The dissertation included (1) 
investigating the gap in interpretations of the Qur’an that extremists exploit to persuade 
Muslim youth; (2) examining Al-Baghdadi's rhetorical methods and the slogans he used 
in his speeches; and (3) shedding light on extreme appeals to identity problematic in the 
Islamic world and the Middle East in particular.  
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 - INTRODUCTION 
According to Tracy (2017), the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is one of the 
deadliest terrorist groups in the world. Browne (2018) suggested that the crimes of ISIS 
have spread to many countries worldwide, and the group remains an international threat. 
Liang (2015) explained how ISIS is an extreme threat to international security in stating 
that it is a distinctive organization that depends on years of leadership experience, and 
warning it has the capacity for intimidation, recruitment, training, and even extortion. 
Tracy stressed that the organization has substantial economic resources that are not 
typically available to extremist organizations. 
After the Arab Spring that swept many countries in the Middle East from 2010-
2014, which toppled multiple authoritarian governments, the phenomenon of terrorism 
and Islamist extremism has emerged in an unprecedented way. This phenomenon exists 
due to a combination of factors, most notably the collapse of governments and sectarian 
conflicts that have grown in that climate of instability. The emergence of several terrorist 
organizations was noticeable, such as Dahesh, al-Qaeda, the Nasra, and Fatah al-Sham, 
groups fighting in the name of the extreme interpretations of the Islamic religion. 
According to Holbrook (2010), these groups use verses from the Koran, and some of the 
teachings of Islam, such as the Prophet Muhammad’s hadith, to justify their crimes and 
hostile acts against innocent people in the Middle East and throughout the world. 
According to the Institute for Economics and Peace Global Terrorism Index (2016), four 
organizations were responsible for 74% of the world's terrorist operations in 2015, 
namely ISIL, Bukharram, the Taliban, and Al Qaeda and its various branches. 
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Hoffman (1999) defined Islamic terrorism as an organized hostile act by an 
individual or an organized group to harm civilians and innocents, where the motive 
serves the purposes of God or Islam as interpreted by the extremists involved. Jackson 
(2007) asserts that many Muslims regard the term Islamic terrorism as inappropriate. 
They demand that Islam not be linked to terrorism because Muslims make many efforts 
to combat terrorism. This assumed link serves the propaganda of terrorist organizations 
that promote the notion that the West considers the whole of the Islamic religion as a 
terrorist organization, which revives the conflict between the West and the Muslims 
around the world.  
According to Liang (2015), ISIS successfully recruited 45,000 foreign fighters, 
which was an unprecedented number. Experts and critics in the Middle East argued that 
the Islamic caliphate intended to control Arab and Islamic countries and establish an 
extremist union to fight the West. Essentially, ISIS has attempted to bring about the 
return of the Crusades with a modern twist of aggressively fighting them off. They 
consider that they are better suited to lead the world. 
According to the American envoy to combat ISIS under President Obama, Brett 
McGurk, “40,000 foreign fighters came from 110 countries who joined ISIS and crossed 
the Turkish border for the sake of al-Baghdadi.” This observation accounts only for the 
countries from which participants originated. The full impact of al-Baghdadi’s influence 
includes the large numbers of ISIS members from these many countries; for example, 
there were tens of thousands of Syrians, Iraqis, and other Arabs involved in the extremist 
organization. These figures show al-Baghdadi's ability to persuade thousands of young 
people worldwide to dedicate themselves to the group and fight, even to the point of 
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suicide, for the founding of a caliphate state. No other modern-day leader or organization 
has persuaded such large numbers of people from all over the world to join an extremist 
army. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, whose real name is Ibrahim al-Badri, was born in 1971 in 
Samarra, central Iraq. He obtained a baccalaureate degree in Islamic studies from the 
University of Baghdad in 1996. Also, he obtained a master's degree in 1999 and a 
doctorate in 2007 from Saddam Hussein University for Islamic Studies. He emerged as a 
leader of ISIS in Iraq several years later. Al-Baghdadi expressed leadership rhetoric in 
Arabic, the primary language of Islam, because the Prophet Muhammad spoke only 
Arabic, and the Qur'an was written in Arabic. Consequently, the focus of this study is on 
the Arab Islamic discourse, which dominates the teachings of the Islamic religion. 
Al-Baghdadi did not use any language other than Arabic in his speeches. Still, he had a 
vast media apparatus that exploited social media to translate his sermons and spread his 
principles in many languages. 
The driving rationale for this dissertation is that Islamist extremism has become a 
complex and challenging issue to address. Few studies that focus on terrorism include the 
goal of understanding the foundations and origins of organized terrorism. Terrorism 
begins with extremism. Extremism is a state of persuasion that has its roots in hardline 
Islamic discourse, which is based on misunderstandings of the verses of the Qur’an and 
the words of the Prophet Muhammad. Thus, this study concerns the main elements of 
extremism and extremist discourse. For example, understanding the foundation and 
success of al-Baghdadi's speeches could prevent the emergence of another Baghdadi or 
new terrorist organization. As is well known, the elements that Osama Bin Laden, the al 
Qaeda leader, used are the same ones that al-Baghdadi relied upon. 
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This dissertation helps to highlight the importance of fighting extremism 
intellectually through rhetoric in parallel with military action because understanding 
Islamic discourse and involved rhetorical techniques could support persuasive counter-
messages to refute extremism and combat its spread. Unfortunately, terrorism cannot be 
defeated only through military solutions. This project could bridge the gap in knowledge 
concerning the methods of persuasion and communication adopted by extremist Islamic 
organizations. Researchers who study the Middle East have suggested that the battle of 
ideas is just as important as the military battle in defeating extremism and terrorism.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze Islamist extremist discourse to 
understand why these groups are attractive and successful in recruiting thousands of 
young people around the world. It is a vital strategy to dismantle and refute this 
discourse. The arguments here focus on studying rhetoric within the Isis organization, 
particularly the rhetorical methods of al-Baghdadi, and analyze the persuasive elements 
in the extremist discourse. These groups use various persuasive methods that are 
enlightened by a neo-Aristotelian methodology and use of the identity concept to create 
division and conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims. Additionally, the aim of this 
study is to explore how Islamist extremism as a persistent and integrated case of 
persuasion and rhetoric from the leader to the public; i.e., it is an ongoing phenomenon. 
 The arguments focus on studying rhetoric within the Isis organization, particularly 
the rhetorical methods of al-Baghdadi, and analyzing the persuasive elements in the 
extremist discourse. The aims of the dissertation are to (a) investigate the gap in 
interpretations of the Qur’an that extremists exploit to persuade Muslim youth, (b) 
examine al-Baghdadi's rhetorical methods and the slogans he used in his speeches, and 
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(c) shed light on extreme appeals to identity problematic in the Islamic world and the 
Middle East in particular.  
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 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are many definitions of persuasion; a broad definition is that persuasion can 
influence others to achieve a particular goal. A persuasive process aims to change the 
positions, beliefs, and behaviors of others. The basis of the persuasion process is the 
interaction between the interlocutors through a nested and flexible process founded on 
logic and science (Oinas-Kukkonen & Harjumaa, 2009). The context of an interpersonal 
relationship defines the manifestation of persuasion. These exchanges can occur in 
diverse contexts such as relationships between a man and woman, friendships among co-
workers and neighbors, and members of religious groups in their places of worship. 
These relationships have the power to withstand distinctive and changing life 
circumstances and are often unconditional with the consent or will of all parties. (Heath 
& Bryant, 2013). 
 Persuasion in personal relationships is not just about what we say, but also what 
we do during interactions (Kirmani & Campbell, 2004). For example, non-verbal 
communication may be more effective than verbal communication. Personal care, smile, 
and physical gestures can be just as compelling as a conversation. It is essential to realize 
that persuasion among people does not always mean winning or defeating the other; 
instead, it provides an appropriate response to ensure a common interest or goal. For 
example, persuasive arguments can be useful in marital dialogues, between brothers and 
sisters, and friends. In other words, objectives of persuasion in personal interactions 
include reinforcing compatibility and satisfaction among parties as they continue their 
relationships (Kirmani &Campbell, 2004; Peters, 2007). 
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 The goals and strategies of persuasion in personal relationships can vary across 
contexts, as do persuasion strategies in public communications. Theories of persuasion 
and communication can be used in many areas of research, including marketing, 
advertising, politics, education, health, and personal relationships. With the advent of 
social networks, persuasion processes became widely available. Social networks have 
contributed to the transmission of persuasion messages to many people simultaneously in 
many countries and with different languages. The structures of persuasive speeches have 
become more straightforward due to social media (Colliander & Dahlén, 2011). These 
means of communication have also contributed to the rise in protest and social 
movements, which have included demands for change worldwide. 
Social Media and the Arab Spring 
Many Arab countries have witnessed an unprecedented rise in social protests in 
recent years. Social movements have grown such that the people are expressing their 
opposition to ruling political regimes and international policies. These movements have 
crystallized various forms of protest by taking advantage of social media techniques and 
networks based on different forms of material and symbolic resources. These movements 
have become unprecedented and have spurred the Arab revolutions that the region has 
known (social, 2017). In Arab nations, the year 2011 marked the emergence of global 
interest in social movements, protests, and strikes. The so-called “Arab Spring,” a vast 
protest movement against the Arab ruling regimes, was aimed at fighting dictatorial 
regimes and creating better and independent lives for the people. Demonstrators in 
Europe also staged protested austerity, and the “Occupy Wall Street” movement took 
over a park in New York City. These events prompted communication scientists to study 
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these social movements and the role of the media in their emergence (Foust & Hoyt, 
2018). 
 Recent years have included a wave of many studies, contributing to a better 
understanding of social movements, social media, and persuasive concepts. Calls have 
emerged from many researchers to combine the best approaches to critical and media 
rhetoric environments to study and interpret social movements. These calls include 
recognizing movements as rhetorical achievements and forces strengthening social 
identity bonds (Foust & Hoyt, 2018). 
 Social movement researchers defined these action groups as mostly informal 
organizations, based on shared beliefs, such as freedom of expression, healthcare for all, 
and fighting corruption. These groups are mobilized and use all kinds of protests to bring 
about changes (Della Porta & Mattoni, 2015). Historically, social movements have 
succeeded in using persuasive messages as influential tools to turn the grievances of 
marginalized classes into the interests of dominant groups. Activists have used the media 
as a tool to influence public thinking and feelings about their issues effectively (Lane et 
al., 2019). Some findings of social movements suggested that their messages may be 
more convincing when they come from the dominant ethnic groups rather than 
marginalized groups (Lane et al., 2019). 
 Most researchers studying social movements have suggested that behind all 
movements are the convincing speeches and means of their communication that 
disseminate rhetoric. Social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook have provided 
more opportunities for activism and social movements. Twitter hashtags serve as a 
framework for many protest movements, allowing activists and those interested in a topic 
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to interact, thus, contributing and enriching these issues and protest movements. For 
example, the hashtag "Black Lives Matter" is the umbrella for millions of supporters 
tweeting this movement. Using this hashtag and others, the supports have renewed 
momentum for this movement and raised interests in racial incidents in the United States 
(Moscato, 2016).  
 The social media give protest movements the space to spread issues away from 
traditional media filters (Moscato, 2016). Social media provide a means of forming 
global networks driven by angry citizens, who are vital to mobilizing international 
support and nurturing global public discourse (Zhu, 2017). Social media provide a unique 
space for protest movements to present a vision, spread their discourse, and present 
arguments in a way that the mainstream media could not provide. Kavada (2016) argued 
that digital media further facilitates decentralized, dispersed, transient, and individual 
forms of political action. These often appear to oppose the concept of the community. 
The importance of social media for contemporary protest movements has been 
highlighted from different perspectives, and much of the focus has been on the functions 
of social networks for sharing information and reaching a broad audience. The goals of 
using these media include convincing the users of a cause and organizing protests 
(Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). 
 All over the world, young people are taking advantage of new media to engage in 
civic issues and protest movements. This move initially indicated the enormous potential 
for change at the global level. The emergence of new political actors and new forms of 
social movements such as the Arab Spring, the Occupy Wall Street movement, Black 
Lives Matter, March for Our Lives, and the Global Climate Strikes provide examples of 
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creative ways which people use new media. Using these media, they exchange 
information, persuade new members, communicate with peers, and mobilize to advance 
their causes and create social mobility challenging to control (Lee, 2020). 
 Researchers describe the relationships between social movements and the media 
as a complex and dynamic interaction. It is well-known that all social movements need 
the media to attract the necessary attention to their cause, and in return, the media interest 
in controversial social and protest movements adds attention to the media sources and 
attracts the masses. For these protest movements to be influential in the political process 
and cultural practices, these movements need the support and attention of the public. 
These media offer opportunities to attract new members and exert pressure on their 
opponents, whether these be governments or regimes (Malinick et al., 2013).  
 Social movements are increasingly using social media to organize collective 
action and social movements. The growth of protest movements has shown how social 
media can mobilize support and momentum; a prime example is the Black Lives Matter 
movement. Social media provide a forum or space where those interested in protest 
movements can compete and struggle over the essence, meaning, and direction of the 
social movement (Wilkins et al., 2019). Scholars have suggested that social media can 
perform the rhetorical functions of social movements by determining the scope and 
agenda of protest movements. For instance, the media can shape who is part of the 
movement and the external objectives (Wilkins et al., 2019). Social media helps form the 
political discourse of protest movements, as defined by the strategies used to create 
persuasive arguments. Social media can structure the argument and develop the group’s 
functions. Speech is the tool used strategically by leaders and activists during social 
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movements to build causes, convince the crowd, and counter the counter-rhetoric to 
achieve their goals. A rhetorical perspective on social media activity can provide insight 
into activists’ discussions of their movement's methods. For example, how do the 
members manage the movement beyond the immediate members of the target group, and 
how do those who formed the group maintain control? (Wilkins et al., 2019).  
The Beginning of Extremism in Islam 
Khan (2014) presented a logical explanation for the early beginnings of Islamist 
extremism. Khan described Islamist extremism movements as beginning in the 7th 
century with the Kharijites as the first movement. This group had political aims and 
ambitions. This movement adopted a dangerous approach—whoever was against them 
was an unbeliever and must be killed. 
In contrast, Moore (2015) monitored the progression of terrorist movement 
timelines. Based on that research, he contends that the genesis of extremist movements 
arose in the early 1960s after the failure of the Western colonialism of the Arab and 
Islamic countries. During that period, revolutionary and popular anti-Western movements 
grew, but these were not religious. In the early 1960s, after the emergence of Israel in the 
Middle East, secular armed movements emerged. According to Moore, the Palestinian 
movement, Fatah, was the first armed group that targeted civilians outside the conflict 
zones. In 1979, the Iranian revolution broke out, which further destabilized the Middle 
East. The situation worsened after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 
1979. This invasion fomented the emergence of Islamist extremist movements in Central 
and South Asia and the broader Greater Middle East. The war between these radical 
movements and the Soviet invaders continued from 1979 to 1989, ending with a victory 
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for the Islamic groups in Afghanistan. After this victory, these groups, specifically al-
Qaida, began attacking targets outside the battle zones and bombing US embassies. 
According to Moore, these attacks culminated in the suicide attacks that destroyed the 
Twin Towers and part of the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. 
Liang (2015) continued explaining the development of other branches of terrorist 
groups following Moore’s (2015) logic. Liang pointed out that after the US invasion of 
Iraq in March 2003 2, al-Qaeda in Iraq emerged under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's 
leadership. In the evolution of the movement, al-Qaeda became the nucleus of the ISIS 
organization, which took control of large areas in Iraq and Syria in 2014-2015. 
Allendorfer and Herring (2015) defined ISIS as a militant and violent group that claimed 
to have revived the Islamic caliphate or Islamic Empire based on the group’s control of 
large areas of Iraq and Syria, which lasted from 2015-2018. These authors explained that 
the organization relies on its professional religious propaganda.  
The establishment of ISIS. The Middle East is a conflict arena for several different 
competing forces, including Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey, and Iran. The Arab Spring of 
2010-2011 produced chaos and emptiness in that region because they have conflicting 
goals in using the Arab Spring for gain. These conflicts have supported the emergence of 
extremist organizations (Abouzeid, 2014). One of the most dangerous of these was ISIS, 
which exploited the flaws and territory left empty by the governments in Syria and Iraq 
and dominated large areas in that region. Observers suggested that the emergence of ISIS 
and its rapid control of vast territories in Iraq and Syria were shocking to the world. ISIS 
exploited chaos and emptiness, and the state of the Islamic caliphate was proclaimed 
through a speech by al-Baghdadi in 2014 (Abouzeid, 2014).  
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ISIS's control over vast areas was not born of the moment, and the speeches and 
declarations of the leader of ISIS were not created in a vacuum. These resulted from a 
long struggle over many years and was accompanied by conditions of suffering in the 
Middle East (Knights, 2014). Cronin (2015) suggests that ISIS began as a small extremist 
Sunni organization after America's occupation of Iraq in 2003. At this point, it was 
known as Al Qaeda in Iraq. The organization’s central idea was that of resisting what 
they referred to as the American Occupier. At that time, the organization was called al-
Qaeda in Iraq and was led by Zarqawi, who owed allegiance to Osama bin Laden, but 
was killed by a US airstrike in June 2006.  
Wood (2015) stated that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was the leader of the organization 
beginning in May 2010, but al-Baghdadi made a dramatic appearance in his famous 2014 
speech in Mosul, Iraq. This speech became famous because it is the first official 
appearance of al-Baghdadi after his disappearance for years, although al-Baghdadi 
released some short audio records before appearing publicly for the first time. Several 
security services were tracking him. After the organization achieved its goals, al-
Baghdadi thought it was the right time to emerge and announced the establishment of the 
new Islamic state. His appearance was remarkable and gave a morale boost to his 
followers. He created influential rhetoric at that time. Wood identified a clear message 
from al-Baghdadi: it is the time to act because he was no longer a gang leader, but was 
now the leader of all Muslims. Wood (2015) concluded that al-Baghdadi might have felt 




Georges (2016) indicated the timing of al-Baghdadi’s 2014 speech has multiple 
meanings because it came in the month of Ramadan, a holy month for Muslims when 
believers are committed to fasting during some the days of the month. Notably, this 
speech was the first in which al-Baghdadi appeared to the public. Al-Baghdadi frequently 
made short audio recordings before he appeared in public, and these recordings 
contributed to people recognizing him. The organization showed videos of speeches on 
social media and the organization's websites. He wore religious clothing and chose Friday 
prayers to deliver it, as Muslims gathered to pray every week. He gave the speech in the 
Mosul Grand Mosque after ISIS gained control of Isis Zhi, a city where more than two 
million people lived. The significance of giving the speech during Ramadan was that it 
was the month in which Allah revealed the Qur'an. The Prophet Muhammad achieved a 
decisive victory during that month against a tribe, the Quraish, who had rejected his 
prophecy. According to Georges (2016), the appearance of al-Baghdadi in a US-
controlled city in Iraq was more daring than Osama Bin Laden. He thus dramatically 
appeared in Ramadan as a spiritual leader of Muslims. 
The division between ISIS and Al Qaeda had occurred before Baghdadi's famous 
speech made in 2014 amid a sharp split between ISIS and al-Qaeda, at a time when 
historians considered ISIS in Iraq as only one of many al Qaeda affiliates, such as those 
in Yemen and Somalia. O’Shea (2016) explained the historical disparity between the two 
organizations when the split between the organization of ISIS and Al Qaeda appeared in 
2013. At that time, the ISIS group was under the command of Abu Ayyub al-Masri until 
al-Baghdadi overturned Zawahiri's orders and took control of the organization (Birke, 
2013). Al-Baghdadi announced the establishment of the Islamic caliphate state in Iraq 
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and Syria in 2014 and accused al-Zawahiri of surrendering to the West. Al-Baghdadi 
declared the caliphate after he dissolved al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Levant in 2006. 
However, the declaration of the caliphate state in Iraq and Syria came after the 
organization's takeover of the Iraqi city of Mosul in 2014 (Knights, 2014). 
Al-Baghdadi took advantage of the Syrian revolution and the collapse of the 
regime in large parts of Syria, succeeding in extending control of Iraqi territory near the 
Syrian border. Gerges (2016) stated that at that time, the Iraqi regime, under the 
leadership of former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, was suffering from limited central 
authority amid the spread of the sectarian approach adopted by the government. Georges 
explained that this led to the accession of thousands of Sunnis to the organization of ISIS. 
Georges described the conditions as critical in the Middle East, especially after the failure 
of the Arab Spring in Syria and Iraq, the outbreak of sectarian wars, the flight of tens of 
thousands from conflict zones, and the displacement of at least 7 million Syrians amid the 
absence of justice. The decline of the US role in the Middle East under the leadership of 
former President Obama was a political stalemate to the international community. The 
Obama administration ignored the conflict in Syria and the withdrawal of US troops from 
Iraq, which allowed Isis to expand in those areas.” ISIS, for a while, managed to preserve 
the territory al-Baghdadi controlled, unlike other extremist organizations that hide in 
remote places around the world (Knights, 2014). 
Extremism and the Destruction of Heritage  
Sullivan (2016) defined cultural heritage as the material artifacts and intangible 
qualities of a society or group inherited from previous generations. According to 
Sullivan, cultural heritage includes a material culture such as old buildings, monuments, 
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books, and even documents, while intangible heritage includes folk habits, folklore, and 
possibly old languages. About the reasons for preserving the heritage, Thomas (1998) 
asserted that heritage is essential for knowing human history because it provides a logical 
basis for verifiable ideas and preserves the past so that people know their stories. Cignoni 
and Scopigno (2008) stated that preserved objects maintain the validity of memories and 
the accuracy of history, which are concrete evidence that must be preserved. Lowenthal 
(1985) affirmed that in human history, the reality of the object or thing attracts people 
and gives them literal ways to touch the past.  
Recently, heritage has been subjected to a campaign of extermination by extremist 
organizations, especially in the Middle East, amid the weak response of the international 
community to the crimes such groups commit. According to al-Taie (2015), ISIS 
destroyed a total of 28 religious and historical buildings in Mosul between 2014 and 
2015, and ISIS deliberately targeted the destruction of cultural heritage, including 
historical artifacts and theft of priceless antiquities. According to MacEoin (2014), the 
real disaster is the destruction of the Mosul archive by ISIS. According to Newsweek 
magazine (Iraq digitating Baghdad national library, 2015), ISIS burned the archive of the 
old Mosul Library, destroying about 100 thousand documents, manuscripts, and old 
books. After this disastrous campaign against heritage, UNESCO Director-General Irina 
Bokova remarked that such attacks on heritage were an unprecedented cultural cleansing. 
MacEoin (2014) revealed that the ISIS organization uses select units to identify the 
targets of archaeological sites to destroy them. 
Pal (2014) suggested that Islam may be subject to deliberate confusion on both 
sides, extremist organizations, and Western media circles. Baghdad in the Abbasid era 
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was a beacon of culture, rhetoric, literature, philosophy, and mathematics. Pal suggested 
that the destruction of the cultural heritage by extremist organizations is aimed at igniting 
cultural conflicts to accompany the successful religious conflicts they began. Many 
researchers perceived that ISIS's radical ideas are based on the abolishment of other 
ideas. The goal of these efforts is the complete elimination of other cultures. Appiah 
(2012) argued that these conflicts created by Islamic extremist organizations between 
Islam and the West are the goal. Appiah reviewed the cultural development reached by 
the Islamic nation in the Abbasid and Umayyad eras and stressed that the Islamic 
organizations are strictly against the crimes toward heritage as these are contrary to the 
Islamic religion. He called for the creation of a unified cultural framework between the 
West and Muslims to respond to these crimes and work on archiving old statues and 
symbols of civilization and protect them from tampering by extremist groups. 
Researchers have made multiple interpretations of the attacks by extremist 
organizations against heritage. Shahab and Isakhan (2018) interpreted the movement for 
the destruction of cultural and civilizational heritage carried out by extremist 
organizations as a ritual of loyalty among these groups. The process of destroying 
heritage also shapes the identity of the recruits to ensure cultural and ideological loyalty. 
This process contributes to the creation of an extremist cultural framework destructive to 
cultural symbols. The extremists may think maintaining traditional heritage represents a 
tolerant historical discourse that runs counter to their reactionary thinking. Shahab and 
Isakhan described how the Heritage Destruction Movement creates an enthusiastic 




In The Guardian, Chulov (2014) wrote that there are significant practical 
objectives behind the destruction of heritage in Iraq and Syria. The most important of 
these is that others could be easily attracted to the movement by destroying the legacy in 
those countries. The destruction of heritage eliminates all cultures and opens the way to 
the culture of radical ISIS to consolidate its culture in history. According to Martin and 
Solomon (2017), ISIS destroys shrines, sells precious statues, and smuggles them out of 
conflict areas to make large profits. They described the operation as one of the strategies 
of extremist organizations to fund their terrorist operations.  
Al-Azm (2014) emphasized the idea of using the heritage and relics in prohibited 
trade to finance extremist groups, especially in examples such as Syria, with its ancient 
civilization. Al-Azm called for concerted cultural and rhetorical efforts to fight this 
organization and described the ISIS terrorist group as the worst criminal organization in 
modern history against heritage and culture and humanity. In Al-Azm’s view, the 
destruction of cultural heritage in Syria and Iraq may cause significant damage to the 
social fabric of the population.  
Klein (2017) described the destruction of the ancient Assyrian statue of Nimrod as 
a serious attempt by ISIS to erase the sites of historical cultures deliberately. The process 
is similar to the destruction of the 1,500-year-old Buddha statue in Afghanistan by the 
Taliban in 2001. Klein explained that there was weak media coverage of these events but 
that some media outlets contributed by recalling the symbolism of these destroyed statues 
and trying to recreate them in the minds of viewers who do not know the cultural and 
civilizational meanings of these statues. He stressed that the media is a partner in the fight 
against extremism and must play its cultural role to preserve the heritage and archive 
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efforts to recall and replicate it. In 2015, Eakin argued in the New York Times that the 
media had played a significant role in publishing the details of the destruction of heritage 
and archival in Iraq and Syria by Isis. However, Eakin considered that the Security 
Council and the US’s condemnations of the destruction of heritage and archives were 
insufficient and did not stop the ongoing destruction of the archives and legacy in Iraq 
and Syria. He described the plight of the monuments in Syria by saying that six 
archaeological sites in Syria have been destroyed by ISIS bombings, along with mosques 
more than 1,000-year-old, archives, antiques, and relics of the Assyrian era sold while the 
international community only condemned it. 
Shorthose (2003) mentioned an extreme cultural context that accompanied the 
campaign of destruction of statues and flagellation by the Taliban during its control of 
Afghanistan. Singing was forbidden, and music was a kind of debauchery for which war 
should be declared. The writer stated that the Taliban considered these shrines as 
alternatives to the worship of God, considered by this terrorist movement as dangerous 
and cannot be allowed. There have been frequent cultural wars against the Afghan 
heritage in all its diversity. To address the idea of heritage destruction, Shorthose said, we 
must first understand the cultural and rhetorical contexts of the Taliban and the 
ideological and intellectual dimensions of the extremist movement.  
 Winter (2014) predicted that the next step is to develop internationally recognized 
methods for preserving the cultural heritage of countries suffering from ethnic, cultural, 
and sectarian conflicts. Winter’s view is that future conflicts in the coming decades may 
center on cultural heritage, archives, and historical symbols that have become the 
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civilizational symbolism of developed nations. Preservation of this history provides hope 
for the lives of those who were oppressed in earlier times (Houdek, 2016).  
This dissertation should bridge the gap in knowledge concerning the methods of 
persuasion and communication adopted by extremist Islamist organizations. Researchers 
who study the Middle East have suggested that the battle of ideas is just as important as 
the military battle in defeating extremism and terrorism. The organizations like Isis 
certainly relied on traditions of Islamic discourse, which are explored next.  
Islamic Discourse 
Islam is one of the most widely practiced religions in the world, with about 1.5 
billion followers. Moreover, it includes some broadly used rhetorical forms from around 
the world. However, Baghdadi’s Islamic discourse has received little attention from 
Western researchers. The reasons for the lack of examination are likely based on 
historical religious divisions, differences in languages, and the historical significance of 
the Crusades (Merriam, 1974). The high level of ambiguity and lack of understanding of 
Islamic discourse is ongoing; thus, rhetorical study on Islamic discourse is in its infancy. 
Although there is also a paucity of studies on Islamic discourse, there is some significant 
work that deals with Islamic rhetoric (Suleiman, 1967). 
Before Islam became a topic of public rhetoric in the Arabian Peninsula, rhetoric 
was about spinning, love, amusement, and the novels of legend. After the introduction of 
Islam, the cultural rhetoric was radically changed because the Holy Qur'an contained a 
linguistic prowess that Arabs had never heard. Therefore, rhetoric in the Qur'an 
dramatically affected public discourse in the Arab region (Murphy, 1966). 
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Merriam (1974) maintained that the rhetorical method of the Qur'an is 
revolutionary in the world of rhetoric. More pointedly, the Qur’an’s discourse is clear, 
and everyone can understand most of its terms. It contains multiple stories, invitations, 
appeals, warnings, interpretations of cosmic accidents, metaphor, simile, 
interconnectedness. The Qur'an is the same version for all Muslims, meaning the last 
unified version of 1,400 years ago has not changed. Therefore, whoever uses the verses 
of the Qur’an in speeches becomes more influential, especially among Muslims. The 
rhetorical art of the Qur'an led many Arab scholars of rhetoric to push for research into 
the Arabic language and rules for rhetorical discipline in the Arabic language. Schools 
and disciplines of rhetoric have emerged, such as the Kufa School in Basra and Baghdad 
in Iraq, and the Alexandria school in Egypt. These schools have developed the Arab 
discipline in rhetoric and have drawn clear boundaries to understand rhetoric in the 
Arabic language (Hamod, 1963). 
Murphy (1966) suggested dividing the rhetoric into three components that remain 
in Arab thought in contemporary times: The first element is meanings; concerning the 
grammatical and other language forms. It is a system that emphasizes the overall unity of 
the text, regarding ideas and sentences and the proper linking of these ideas and sentences 
with each other, and it is concerned with different methods of speech. The second 
element is the statement. The statement provides a focus on the investigation of the 
methods of expression. It is one of the arts of Arabic rhetoric, and this system is 
concerned with rhetorical images in the text. One of the pillars of this field is a simile, for 
example, “Jake is as fast as the wind;” here is likening Jake to the fast wind that does 
everything quickly. For example, “Jake is a lion,” and here it describes Jake as brave, 
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reliable, and a leader. Statements mean in the Arabic language that the rhetorical picture 
in the text is based on a system of simile. The third part is the system of metaphor and is 
concerned with the style of speech. The discipline of metaphor includes the decoration of 
speech using schemes and tropes. 
Moreover, a definition of metaphor is the symbol used in which the relationship 
between the meaning and the transferred meaning is similar. Therefore, metaphor is 
based on the similarity of the relationship between one symbol and its referent. For 
example, when someone says, "I met a sea that gives to the poor and the needy," the 
meaning here is a similar understanding between a generous man and the sea. 
Merriam (1974) suggested that some scholars held that after the death of the 
prophet, especially in the Abbasid period in the year 750, rhetoric had been made 
complete. They considered that the existing rhetoric had been fully numbered and 
classified in the basic Islamic curriculum using the Arabic grammar, the vocabulary of 
speech, literature, and lexicography of Quranic studies. The oldest and most universally 
respected Islamic university among Muslims, Al-Azhar University in Cairo, pioneered 
Islamic rhetoric. Researchers were interested in studying the details of the rhetoric, such 
as emotional appeal, lament, sound knowledge, fluency, gestures, rhythmic sounds, and 
clarity. These detailed studies are ongoing and taught in most Islamic universities 
(Hamod, 1963). 
Suleiman (1967) stated that Arabs have shown great interest in rhetoric and have 
been at the center of scholarly conversations because it is not just a theoretical 
framework, but it is of practical value for the people and authors. Some have suggested 
that even before the advent of Islam, Arabs were highly appreciative of rhetoric. For 
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example, an Arabic proverb expresses that “the beauty of a person lies in his tongue” 
when referencing an ability to speak eloquently and convincingly (Murphy, 1966). 
Before Islam, Arab tribes considered the ideal person’s qualities in rhetoric, archery, and 
horse riding. The high esteem with which they held rhetoric made it a symbol of integrity 
and modernity at the time (Merriam, 1974). 
Scholars of Islamic rhetoric are of two types. The first type prefers to use rhetoric 
in the curriculum, poetry, literature, prose, and other non-religious arts. The second type 
links rhetoric to religion and the Qur'an. These scholars encouraged the dominance of 
religious rhetoric in the last decades of the history of Islam (Clark, 2007). They contend 
that Islamic discourse is entirely different from the Western discourse and is not negative 
even in painful times (Suchan, 2014). 
The metaphor has dominated Islamic rhetoric, causing many scholars of language 
to neglect logic as a distinguishable part of persuasion for Islamic cultures. Khaldun, one 
of the most prominent language scholars in the 13th century, supported linking logic with 
persuasion and defined rhetoric as a kind of logical reasoning that can influence the 
public and serve the goals of speech (Murphy, 1966). 
In the Abbasid period, 750-1285 CE, the expansion of the Muslim world had 
reached the borders of Europe and the Mediterranean. In that period, Muslims knew of 
the Greek achievements in rhetoric, including the philosophical works of Plato and 
Aristotle. Greek philosophy was a significant revolution in Arab culture with all its 
literary and scientific ramifications, which led language scholars to name that era as 
golden in Muslim history (Salazar, 2016). 
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Islamic traditions have fostered respect for rhetoric and the principles of 
productive discourse. In Arabic culture, rhetoric is present in all fields, including 
traditional education in the Arab world, and the social and political dynamics (Clark, 
2007). On Friday of each week, there is a sermon dominated by rhetorical ornamentation 
to influence the audience. This sermon originated as God's will and was carried out by 
the Prophet Muhammad; thus, it remains present in contemporary times (Hamod, 1963). 
Islamic rhetoric did not contain a unified tone. However, by its nature, this 
rhetoric carries a convincing tone intended to impact the lives of millions of people. 
Since Muslims believe that the Qur'an is a directive from God, its appeals, requests, 
warnings, statements, and interpretations have a strong influence on Muslims (Salazar, 
2016). Merriam (1974) suggested that Islamic rhetoric has commonalities with the Greco-
Roman tradition. Both traditions have grown in rhetorical methods. Al-Farabi and Ibn 
Khaldoun stressed the complexities of rhetoric, especially in its use to seek the truth. 
Scholars have asserted that the persuasive system in Islam demands more criticism and 
scrutiny.  
In the present era, much Islamic rhetoric is a lament for the glories of the past. 
Current religious rhetoric has evolved into patterns using new persuasive strategies of 
action and reaction. In other words, Muslims are eager to restore the former glories; 
therefore, calls to unite and work as one nation are reliable and productive as they were in 
the past. There are many appeals to revive the divided Islamic nation and unify it to grow 
out of its crises and backwardness. (Clark, 2007). Language researchers are aware that 
religious rhetoric dominates, and this type of rhetoric is a tool for some extremist 
organizations (Rogan, 2010). 
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 The rhetoric used by the late al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was not new in the 
history of Islamic discourse. He relied on the same messages revealed from the beginning 
of Islam, such as the conflict between truth and falsehood. He linked his speeches to the 
verses of the Qur’an that related to ancient events. However, differences have emerged 
among many Muslim entities, which have erupted into internal religious conflicts. 
Rhetoric related to these differences has emerged to influence the public through 
persuasion (Pierce, 2014). Researchers have concluded that Bin Laden benefited from his 
understanding of Islamic studies and language when making influential speeches. bin 
Laden used rhetorical decorations in his speeches, and comprehensively used the main 
elements of persuasion in his speeches (Rowland & Theye, 2008). Although 10 years of 
war have continued since Bin Laden’s time, al-Qaeda remains active. Despite the death 
of bin Laden, al-Qaeda continues to promote his speeches and focus on the rhetoric and 
persuasive elements in his speech. For example, Bin Laden focused on uniting the nation 
in the face of the Crusader war on Islam (Pierce, 2014). 
 ISIS's organization in Iraq emerged with a similar ideology as that of al-Qaeda. 
The same rhetorical patterns used by Bin Laden are used by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the 
leader of ISIS. There is a vast religious rhetorical machine in the Muslim world that has 
been exploited by extremist groups to recruit youth. For clarification, religious discourse 
is widely practiced among Muslims, and there are speeches every week, mainly on 
Friday. There are five daily prayers. Verses of the Qur’an are read in every prayer. These 
recurring messages may be viewed as the foundation of a vast religious rhetorical 
machine in the Muslim world that has been exploited by extremist groups to recruit 
youth. For example, in their sermons, extremists describe the power of Muslim youth as a 
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flood that will sweep the world and not stop them about resolve, strength, and toughness. 
They also describe the jihadists as being able to uproot the mountains from their roots, 
their vigor, and activity in the service of Islam. Consequently, religious discourse is 
fertile content used by extremists to provide more radical interpretations of Islam. 
McCants (2015) claimed that ISIS's leader devoted most of his interests in 
spreading rhetoric to the largest audiences in the world. Modern technology was available 
to al-Baghdadi, which did not exist during the time of Bin Laden. ISIS created a 
magazine called Dabig to publish the speeches of al-Baghdadi and other extremist 
rhetoric on an ongoing basis. Most of the rhetoric of al-Baghdadi bore the old spirited 
slogans, such as Islamic Nation, the victory of Muslims, the fight against infidels, and 
defending the honor of the Islamic Ummah, which he claimed Zionist Americans had 
invaded. This dissertation sought to pursue understanding of how this was done, 
suggesting the second question:   
RQ1: What are the persuasive elements and arguments on which al-Baghdadi 's 
rhetoric was based?  
So much argument in the Islamic world relates to the Qur’an, which is explored next.  
Interpreting the Qur’an 
  The Qur'an contains many speeches and dialogues that Allah addressed to 
Muslims. These are characterized as directives, and clergy interpret the directives in 
many diverse ways. For example, hardline clerics focus on a forceful approach and view 
it as the most effective way of achieving the goals of Islam. These hardline 
interpretations support a radical discourse that thrives on the interpretation that the goals 
are best achieved through force. Many Muslims are victims of these radical 
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interpretations of Islamic discourse. On the contrary, there are more tolerant 
interpretations of Islamic discourse and the directives of the Qur'an. These less radical 
views are reflected in the clergy’s weekly speeches on Fridays, holidays, Ramadan, and 
hajj seasons.  
 Parsaei (2013) defined the Holy Quran as orders from God sent to people through 
the Prophet Muhammad to the Arab region and Hijaz, with these directives issued on 
different occasions between the period 610 - 632 CE. Muslims also believe that the 
Quran is a revelation from God to the Prophet Muhammad, and Muslims must follow the 
approach of the Koran. Parsaei (2013) emphasized that the Quran is a divine and dynamic 
text. According to Parsaei, the history of the Quran dates to the beginning of the 7th 
century. Arya (2017) confirmed that the Qur'an was completed at the beginning of the 
seventh century, and he believed that the descent of the Quran accompanied a period of 
development of Arabic poetry when it reached its peak. Ancient Muslim scholars have 
established an interpretive book of the Quran that explains the text's ambiguity. 
Mufti (2017) defined tafsir as a classical knowledge that explains and interprets 
the Qur'an. The interpretation treated the Qur'an as the word of God and a divine 
revelation to the Prophet Muhammad. The interpretation also describes the Qur'an as a 
unique divine miracle. To understand some of the leading principles of the Islamic 
religion, Paçacı (2013) explained the sources of legislation in the Islamic religion in order 
of importance: The Quran is the primary source of Islamic legislation, the Hadith (Hadith 
of the Prophet or [Sunna]) is the second source of legislation, and then QIYAS, (IJMA, 
consensus) and ijtihad. The meaning of the Sunnah is considered the Prophet's Hadith 
and his approach to applying the Islamic religion, which Muslims view as a definitive 
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source in controversial issues. The QIYAS resolves recent issues by comparing them to 
stories or conversations of the Prophet and sometimes the views of those who lived with 
the Prophet Muhammad. The IJMA or consensus also means that former and current 
clerics agree on a unified view on one of the legitimate issues. Paçacı (2013) defined 
Ijtihad as the views of the clergy in recent controversial cases, which do not have 
provisions from the four previous sources. Intisar (2009) is not far from this definition, 
where Ijtihad is defined as a mental and perhaps physical effort to carry out a particular 
activity. Esposito (2014) explained the concept of ijtihad by treating it as an Islamic term 
that usually refers to independent thinking or independent judgment on a contemporary 
issue in Islam. Ijtihad requires several conditions, including knowledge of religious 
science (theology), proficiency in the Arabic language, and comprehensive knowledge of 
jurisprudence (faghy). With the beginning of the eighteenth-century, Muslim scholars 
began to demand the transition from traditional judgments and open the door to ijtihad to 
address contemporary issues. 
Hallaq (1984) viewed the definition of ijtihad as the exertion of mental energy in 
the search for a legal opinion to the extent that the faculties of the jurist become incapable 
of further effort. In other words, ijtihad is the maximum effort expended by the jurist to 
master and apply the principles and rules of typical Muslim opinion. However, Jannati 
(2010) has another opinion that there is no consensus on the definition of the term ijtihad 
by Muslim scholars. He observed that the interpretations of the term ijtihad, which he 
reviewed in-depth, do not seem true. Jannati explained that most of the definitions fail to 
determine the meaning of ijtihad technically and logically, and considers that 
explanations may be needed to clarify the term in general. Some of the definitions appear 
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to contradict verses of the Koran, and sometimes the contradictions are created by citing 
verses from the Koran, which is an act thought by some to be sinful (Jannati, 2010). 
The issue of ijtihad raises much controversy in research circles, particularly with 
Islamic and Western researchers, many of whom consider it the authoritative source on 
which extremists rely to interpret verses of the Quran. In this regard, Venkatraman (2007) 
explained, based on the Quranic principles of ijtihad that terrorists interpret the Quran's 
principles on violence and perform their “holy interpretations” as a legitimate premise for 
using excessive aggression. Venkatraman supported that the extremists use the ijtihad in 
providing unique interpretations appropriate to their extremist agenda. Venkatraman also 
stated that terrorists use ijtihad to emphasize Quranic clauses that sanction violent Jihad 
as a design ordained by God to preserve the Shariat in an Islamic community. However, 
Hallaq (1984) considered strict conditions to fulfill before the case for ijtihad is made. 
These conditions are not available to extremist leaders such as al-Qaeda and others. 
According to the article, the conditions of ijtihad are stringent and must consider several 
elements before interpreting it, such as the Quran (the Guide), the Hadeeth (Sunnah), the 
analogy (qiyas), and the unanimity of scientists (ijma). If a similar provision is not found 
in these elements, it is not viewed as a legitimate interpretation. Parsaei (2013) argued 
that the ijtihad made significant contributions to the improvement of the Quranic text. 
Parsaei called for maintaining diligence as a valid element in harmonizing the text of the 
Quran with contemporary issues that did not exist before, considering that the mujtahid 
and faqhi discover the relation between the variable and constant needs. Parsaei 
demanded that legitimate researchers who can continue their efforts to interpret and adapt 
the verses of the Quran through the gate of ijtihad do so. 
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Regarding the credibility of the Koran, most Muslims believe in the truth of the 
Quran but many scientists have raised several questions about the Quran's text and 
stability from over 1400 years ago. Scientists asked about the sources that wrote or 
quoted from the Quran and the criteria they adopted in their writing of the Qur'anic text. 
Infante (1980) argued that a valid approach should be applied to ensure credible sources 
that transmit texts. He called for specific measures to be applied to sources that list 
narratives or write historical texts. Infante supports the general idea that the credibility of 
the source, experience, and dynamism must be considered to verify the text validity, and 
that the credibility of the source may be affected by the circumstances and the state of 
communication. He argued that there are also five other criteria to consider in the source: 
the physical characteristics of the source and message, inferred source attributes, source 
functions for receivers, receivers' criteria for judging sources, and receivers' beliefs and 
behaviors. 
According to Saeed (2008), the current debates on the Quran and its 
interpretations and meanings are often complex and controversial. Fortunately, Muslims 
have unanimously agreed on the oneness of the Quranic text that will never change. 
Unfortunately, differences lie in its interpretation; there are dozens of books of analysis 
due to the diligence and depth of scholars’ perceptions. Although the Prophet 
Muhammad has interpreted many verses of the Quran, another issue has arisen: the 
credibility of those who convey the hadith of the Prophet Muhammad. This issue of 
credibility has become a significant problem for Muslims. Nevertheless, if the opinions 
differ in a critical case, the real reference to the resolution is the Quran and its 
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interpretations, where the ijtihad will be present in some contemporary issues (Bakhtiar, 
2010).  
According to Arya (2017), the debate has intensified after the recent terrorist 
attacks perpetrated in the name of Islam and the continued spread of extremism. 
Specifically, the debate has strengthened after the emergence of leaders of international 
terrorist organizations reading the Qur'anic verses during terrorist operations to justify 
their brutal actions in the context of religion. These actions led to the emergence of the 
term “Islamic terrorism” in the press and research studies. Supporting Arya’s claim, 
Piazza (2009) stated that the Islamist terrorist groups are indeed more lethal. Over the 
period 1968 to 2005, Islamist groups were responsible for 93.6% of all terrorist attacks by 
religiously-oriented groups and were responsible for 86.9% of all casualties inflicted by 
religiously-oriented terrorist groups (Piazza, 2009). Arya (2017) attributed the wave of 
extremism to the misinterpretation of the Qur'an by extremist organizations despite the 
existence of other sub-causes. Arya held that Arab and Western scholars recently realized 
that Muslim extremists and moderates rely on different interpretations of the Quran. 
There has been a renewed interest in understanding the literary and rhetorical devices of 
the Quran and how they influence its message (Arya, 2017).  
Saeed (2008) categorized research on Muslim attitudes in interpreting the Qur'an 
into categories. "In this respect, most Muslims can be loosely grouped into one of three 
main categories: textualists, semi-textualists, or contextualists. These categories give a 
useful insight into the general trends of today's Qur’anic interpretation” (Saeed, 2008, 
p.1). Saeed continued in detailing these categories. Textualists argued for a "literal" 
reading of the Quran and believed that its message should remain "pure" and should not 
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be subordinated to the demands of modern society. Semi-textualists differ from 
textualists in that they make some minor concessions to the conditions of modernity and 
are often associated with an apologetic discourse. Contextualists are "those who believe 
that certain teachings of the Quran could be applied differently depending on the specific 
time and place" (Saeed, 2008, p.1). For clarification, there are some interpreters who 
believe that the interpretations of the Qur'an should be updated according to today's 
development. It may be modified according to need, but some hard-liners believe 
otherwise and want to keep strict interpretations of the Qur’an. 
Holbrook (2010) stated that the reason for the surge in extremism in the Middle 
East is the insistence of extremist groups on the literal interpretation of the Quran to serve 
their religious and political agenda. The author identified three groups that embrace this 
approach in interpreting the Qur'an, the Muslim Brotherhood, through the ideas of Mr. 
Qutb, the New Wahhabis, and the Islamic Movement in Jordan led by al-Maqdisi. 
Holbrook provided a powerful example by explaining the interpretation of the Quran by 
extremists according to their agenda. He writes; 
 The declaration from the ‘World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and 
 Crusaders,’ issued in February 1998, announced the ambition of the group that 
 later became known as Al-Qaeda to ‘kill the Americans and their allies—civilians 
 and military.’  
The declaration, which is now seen as one of the more important public messages from 
the Al-Qaeda leadership, began by quoting Sura At-Taubah (9): 5, urging Muslims to 
recognize their duty to “slay the idolaters” wherever they were found. However, the 
verse, as it was written by bin Laden and his co-signatories, quoted only half the ayah, 
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commanding Muslims to besiege idolaters wherever they could be found as soon as the 
months wherein fighting was prohibited had passed. Left out was the second part of the 
ayah— “but if they repent and fulfil their devotional obligations and pay the zakat, then 
let them go their way, for God is forgiving and kind.” This is demonstrative of bin 
Laden’s selective application of the Qur’an to fit his specific ambitions. (p. 7) 
Lumbard (2017) confirmed this incident and stated that extremist organizations 
misled people based on the fragmentary interpretations of the verses of the Quran and the 
words of the Prophet Muhammad. He added that Muslims of all denominations believe 
that the diversity of interpretations for the Qur'an is a mercy for the people, and this is 
one of the reasons for the diverse interpretations of the Koran.  
Terrorist groups have presented misleading interpretations of the word jihad in the 
Quran to implement their agenda. This is an issue raised by many researchers. The word 
jihad itself is controversial in Islam and the world. According to Bansal (2009), jihad is 
perhaps the most loaded word in the lexicon of Islam's relations with the West. One of 
the most congested areas of debate is whether the Qur'an sanctions jihad in all instances 
or only in particular circumstances. Bansal mentioned that many scholars agree with the 
meaning of the word jihad in that it does not necessarily mean religious war. The word 
jihad does not literally mean fighting or war at all: a translation truer to the original 
Arabic would be "effort” (Bansal, 2009). 
Burkholder (2002) further argued the meanings of the word jihad by stating, "In 
the Quran, jihad is frequently followed by the expressions ‘in the path of God’ and ‘with 
your wealth and your selves.” For some Muslims, the term jihad has also come to mean 
the “sacralization of the combat.” Burkholder explained that despite its popular meaning 
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as a sacred armed struggle or war, Muslims have always understood the term jihad to 
embrace a broader struggle to transform oneself and society. The Quran uses the word in 
its various meanings ranging from warfare to contemplative spiritual struggle and even 
exhortation (Burkholder, 2002). For his part, Yahya (2015) warned that the interpretation 
of the word jihad does not mean war. The use of ambiguous interpretations has distorted 
the term jihad. In Islam, Jihad has many definitions: wars, exerting all efforts, obstacles, 
and to strive for Allah’s cause using materials and souls. The problem is that the term 
Jihad has been judged commonly as a word of war. However, Islam has been revealed as 
a religion conveying peace upon human beings (Yahya, 2015). Arya (2017) asked, “Is the 
Qur’an a spiritual text that links human existence to divine benevolence? Or does the 
Qur’an advocate martyrdom and justify violence against non-believers?” (p.1). 
Lumbard (2017) stated that to counter radical ideology effectively, there must be 
an understanding of classical Islamic traditions. The Qur'anic interpretation is of 
fundamental importance in this endeavor. Lumbard added that the interpretation of the 
Quran is key to distinguishing between most moderate Muslims and other militant 
organizations such as al-Qaeda and ISIS (Lumbard, 2017).  So many key appeals from 
the Qu’ran were evident in al Baghdadi’s rhetoric, that such strategy suggested the third 
research question: 
RQ2: How did al-Baghdadi exploit the interpretations of the Qur’anic text to 
support his arguments?  





The Concept of Identity in the Middle East 
During the 1960s and 1970s, nationalism dominated the Arab majority states, and 
several such countries, including Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, united to become a single state 
under the slogan: “Be united in one country.” This agreement had broken down by the 
end of the 1970s (Khalil, 2017). At that time, Arab intellectuals and researchers sought a 
framework to define the meaning of identity under the guise of nationalism. In other 
words, religious influences on identity were absent, and Arab provincialism was the 
primary determinant of identity. (Anderson, 1989). Leaders of Arab countries and the 
citizens they governed had relied on the concept of an independent state as their identity. 
A religious revolution, which called for a focus on inclusive Islamic identity and the 
abolition of state borders, had yet to emerge.  
More recently, there are still sharp debates among scholars on the purpose and 
meaning of that national identification (Feghali, 1997). Commonly, many Arabs believed 
there was a link between identity and national culture, and they did not consider a 
difference between the two. Intellectuals considered that the identity of a nation manifests 
in its culture, literature, architecture, music, and other cultural determinants (Khalil, 
2017). Lewis (1998) explained the complexities surrounding Arab identity by stating that 
people in the Middle East had an old and deeply rooted identity that has recently 
undergone profound changes. Lewis suggested that in some cases, Arab identity can 
center on a small group with shared memories of a collective past and events that were 
crucial to them. The long-standing sense of Arabs as being far from an historical identity 
changed entirely after the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in the late 1970s. 
The Iranian revolution changed the cultural landmarks of the Middle East. After the 
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advent of the revolution, religion played a central role in identity. Since this time, 
religious identity has emerged in the Middle East as a substitute for national and state 
identities. Arab intellectuals have pondered this subject for over 100 years (Telham, 
2004). 
A religious concept of identity spread across the Middle East and became 
dominant; concomitantly, Islamist movements became more influential on the streets of 
Arab and Islamic neighborhoods. Islamic revolution occurred in Iran because the interest 
of many people turned to religion (Al-Abdeh, 2016). Clerics presented an integrated and 
comprehensive identity based on the Islamic Ummah. These religious leaders posited no 
difference between Arab, non-Arabic, white, and black as long as they are all Muslims 
(Al-Abdeh, 2016). They successfully abolished the political and ethnic boundaries that 
had previously set identity and redefined identity as religious. At this time, radical 
ideologies emerged and began to spread in the Middle East. Some Muslims felt that they 
were superior to the West and should lead the world. 
 The Arabs across the Middle Eastern region were affected by the Iranian religious 
revolution. An Islamic religious awakening began to emerge and brought forward 
consideration of Islam as a comprehensive framework for Arab identity regardless of the 
ethnic and cultural differences in the region (Feghali, 1997). As the concept of brothers in 
Islam has emerged, the borders of nations have become perfunctory. According to Khalil 
(2017), all Muslim countries should be as one nation and united by one culture.  
According to Nairn et al. (2015), religion is an interconnected system of symbols 
that promotes a specific identity and provides a specific understanding of the world. 
Using the concept of identity, its ramifications, and uncertainties, Islamic extremist 
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organizations have exploited blind adherence to Islamic identity. Moreover, they began to 
create a state of civil conflict, putting forward the idea that other non-Muslims are a real 
threat to this nation and Islam. Muslim identity was one of the central axes used by Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamist extremist terrorist group, the Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS), to persuade and recruit members.  
 Identification and persuasion. The question of identity is common to all human 
beings. When questions about identity coincide with a person’s moments of fragility, this 
may lead to a personal rift that violent extremist movements exploit to persuade the 
individual (Sen, 2006). Every human being has multiple identities; these identities are 
neither fixed, nor are they equally important over time because their meanings can 
change according to events and circumstances (Collier & Thomas, 1988). Although 
scholars have different definitions for the word identity, the most portray it as meaning a 
sense of belonging to a group, suggesting that it is part of an individual's perception of 
self, often linking it to nationality, religion, or race (Bone, Griffin, & Scholz, 2008). 
Individuals and societies tend to classify the world into the "us" and "them" communities. 
Those in power and the public opinions can sow the seeds of favoritism and tolerance 
toward a reference group in part by exaggerating the negatives of the “other” or out-
group (Howard, 2000). Mere affiliation with a specific group in conditions of war, 
competition, and conflict of interest may be sufficient grounds for the emergence of 
intolerance against another group. In other words, groups and individuals tend to classify 
others in categories that are either preferred because they support the group identity, or 
not preferred because they are different from the reference group (Pager & Shepherd, 
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2008). This identification process occurs with individuals and groups or communities 
under specific circumstances (Howard, 2000). 
Kenneth Burke described Aristotle’s key persuasive appeals and other less 
recently defined forms of rhetoric based on persuasion with a focus on identity (Yan et 
al.,2012). Burke perceived his theories as a contribution to the newer discourse about 
persuasion. Communication scholars have suggested that identification should be the 
principal concern of the new discourse (Burke, 1969; Hansen, 1996). Hansen stated, 
“Whereas the old rhetoricians placed identification as a means for persuasion, the new 
rhetoricians reversed the proposition. They argued that persuasion is but one means for 
identification within rhetorical discourse” (Hansen, 1996, p. 51). 
Many scholars have agreed that identity is a persuasive strategy that motivates 
positions and actions (Hogan, 2012; Stiff & Mongeau, 2016). Yan et al. (2012) argued 
that Burke’s “concept of rhetoric as identification” broadened “the traditional view of 
rhetoric as persuasion” to include virtually any means of “inducing cooperation and 
building communities” (p. 279). Persuasion is a term that includes influence. The process 
of persuasion encompasses the influencing of beliefs, motives, and behaviors. Persuasion 
is a complicated process requiring some or all the elements of spoken words, a 
meaningful discourse, a compelling argument, and visual tools for conveying information 
and stirring emotions (Sornig, 1989). Discourse is a means by which a political leader 
conveys messages to the community. To be persuasive, a leader must persuade the 
audience often by appealing to the theoretical and methodological commitments the 
listeners already hold (Hogan, 2012).  
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An in-depth awareness of collective group identity can become a powerful 
weapon directed brutally against another group (Sen, 2006). When a person or group has 
an inflated sense of identity, leaders or authority figures could direct these individuals to 
commit acts of violence and terror. A sense of identity can be a source of pride, joy, 
strength, and trust (Sen, 2006). Many experts and researchers have agreed that defeating 
ISIS and the ideals of jihadist organizations are not merely military and security issues. 
They have also agreed that this is not a physical war, but primarily, a battle of ideas 
(Corman et al., 2006). However, despite this general agreement, there are differences 
over the meaning of the phrase "battle of ideas." Some believe that extremist 
organizations have a cross-border religious identity; for example, some Muslims are 
invoking a shared Islamic identity with Islamic separatists in the southern Philippines and 
sympathizing with them in the face of the infidel Philippine government. The situation is 
similar among the separatists in China, where Muslims have united against the 
authoritarian state (Al-Abdeh, 2016). The researchers acknowledge the difficulty of 
finding alternatives to the radical cross-border identity. Academics have argued for the 
revival of Arab nationalism. They espouse that the state-based identities of the past are 
irreparably damaged, and a newer version of Arab nationalism could be a unifying factor 
for the divided region as well as an alternative identity. (Abdo, 2016). 
Nevertheless, identity need not be singular; it may be multiple and include 
cultural and religious or ideological elements. The most dangerous is an identity based on 
intolerance toward the others; a duality of right and wrong, and good and evil, are the 
basis for such identity (Abdo, 2016). Extremist groups exploit the collective religious 
identity as a means of persuasion. These groups use strategies to involve their targets 
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emotionally and manipulate their deep faith, religious ignorance, and confusion about 
identity or anger at injustice. These are vital steps in the process of extremism that can 
lead to violence. By accepting a concept of identity under these conditions, many people 
become victims of the temptations provided by these movements, and they adopt strict 
interpretations of faith, race, and gender to assert superiority over others (Abdo, 2016; 
Al-Abdeh, 2016). 
Identity Theory Development 
Tajfel et al. (1979) contributed to the construct of social identity by defining it as 
an individual’s sense of self-based on membership in a group (Scheepers & Ellemers, 
2019). Tajfel suggested that groups such as castes, families, and soccer teams are 
essential sources of pride and self-esteem. In Tajfel’s view, a sense of belongingness to 
groups gives people social identity and belonging to the social world. The author 
espoused that the world is divided into “us and others,” meaning that the world classifies 
people based on their social identities. Tajfel et al. suggested assigning the public into 
groups is based on a natural human cognitive process, that is, the tendency to group 
things. Thus, people tend to exaggerate the differences among groups and the similarities 
within groups to reinforce the assigning of people to groups. The central premise of the 
theory concerns the idea of an in-group and out-group or the “us and them” mentality. 
Members of a specific group sometimes define those in other groups negatively, and thus, 
enhance their self-image and group image (Tajfel et al., 1979). 
Social identity theory includes the idea that people derive their self-concept from 
their membership in a group or groups, and that individuals place importance and 
emotional value on the groups to which they belong. Thus, they have a bias against other 
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groups’ behaviors and attitudes (Greene, 1999). Often, people prefer the groups to which 
they belong and identify with other related external groups. Those seeking to influence 
group members with such biases can be appealed to using persuasion. Biased views of 
the culture of others can lead to racism, and racism and in its extreme forms can lead to 
wars and genocides, such as that promoted in Germany toward the Jews, Rwanda among 
the Hutus and Tutsis, and between Sunnis and Shiites in the Islamic world (Scheepers & 
Ellemers, 2019).  
In providing contemporary explanations for group behavior, social identity theory 
has become the most influential theory regarding group relations. The theory evolved 
from explanations of intergroup behavior, and the central tenet became that group 
identity is the primary cause of intergroup behavior. (Hogg, 2016). Social identity theory 
has been developed to include individual theories that focus on social influence, group 
norms, leadership within and between groups, self-promotion, individuality, social 
behavior, social mobilization, protest, marginalization, and deviation within groups. The 
theory was also developed to explain organizational phenomena and the dynamics of 
language and speech style as identity symbols (Hogg, 2016). 
 Social identity theory is most useful in exploring intergroup dimensions and 
determining the details that generate group and identity dynamics (Hogg et al.,1995). 
According to the theory of social identity, social identities differ in strength and content; 
for example, one may be strongly united with Muslims, Christians, and others. The 
content of social identity is determined by the group's features, such as Muslims celebrate 
Ramadan and fast for 30 days, also the colors associated with a soccer team, and the 
slogans of religious and ethnic groups. Social identity also determines feelings about 
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group outcomes, such as depression after losing a favorite team (Scheepers & Ellemers, 
2019). In general, positive correlations were found between social identity and self-
esteem (Kaye et al., 2019). Since its original formulation, social identity theory has 
expanded from its focus on group relationships to encompass a wide range of 
phenomena. The social identity approach has become one of the most widely used 
perspectives in contemporary social psychology (Brown, 2020). The application of this 
key theory to al Baghdadi’s Isis rhetoric suggested the fourth research question:   
RQ3: How does al-Baghdadi exploit the concept of identity to persuade thousands 
of young Muslims? 
In summary, I discussed in the literature review the concept of persuasion, the 
contribution of social media in supporting protest revolutions, the main concepts 
embodying persuasion in Islamic extremist discourse in general, and radical discourse by 
al-Baghdadi. I have highlighted the rhetoric of Islam, identity, interpretation of the 
Qur'an, the relationship between extremism, destruction of heritage, and some secondary 
matters that explain how persuasion occurs in radical Islamic discourse. This project 
seeks to bridge the gap in knowledge concerning the methods of persuasion and 
communication adopted by extremist Islamist organizations by exploring critical 
questions about extremist rhetoric in the person of al-Baghdadi. To reiterate the study’s 
four research questions:  
RQ1: What are the persuasive elements and arguments on which al-Baghdadi 's 
rhetoric was based?  
RQ2: How did al-Baghdadi exploit the interpretations of the Qur’anic text to 
support his arguments?  
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RQ3: How al-Baghdadi does exploit the concept of identity to persuade thousands 
of young Muslims? 
Next, I examine the ways to analyze and critique al-Baghdadi 's primary four 
discourses and appeals that began in 2014 and occurred in various circumstances until the 
last speech before his death in 2019 before actually doing so. Following the methodology 
chapter, I use Aristotle's traditional methodology and identity theory and the 
identification concepts of Kenneth Burke to analyze the discourses. Gamal Abdel 
Nasser’s concepts were used for discourse analysis and the theory of social identity. I 
then examine the speeches and focus on invention, integration of arguments and logic 
into speech, and the existence of evidence. Also, I focus on arrangements, especially the 
structure of the discourse presented, the body, and the conclusions in the discourse 
seeking enthymemes the audiences were expected to supply. The style is the subject of 
much discussion, such as understandable and simple language and strong and connected 
ideas. Finally, I analyze al-Baghdadi's speeches and his intellect in using words at 
appropriate times and linking them to the verses of the Qur'an. The dissertation will also 






  - METHODOLOGY 
Four major approaches were taken to analyze al-Baghdadi ’s rhetoric: the neo-
Aristotelian approach, Gamal Abdel Nasser-style rhetoric, Burke's identification 
concept, and social identity theory. First, neo-Aristotelianism is explored.  
The Neo-Aristotelian Approach 
Arabic literature is influenced by Greek literature. During the ninth and twelfth 
centuries, Ibn Rushd translated and transmitted Aristotle's studies, including rhetoric. 
Moreover, these works were studied in Arab learning centers. Ibn Rushd was working 
according to the Prophet Muhammad (seek knowledge even in China). Ibn Rushd had 
argued that the study of Greek logic and philosophical discourse complemented the 
teachings of Islam rather than contradicted them (Clark, 2007). Ibn Rushd, Ibn Sina, and 
Al-Farabi presented extensive studies on the book of Aristotle's rhetoric and transferred 
them to the Arabic language, which was affected by this addition (Ezzaher, 2015). The 
entry of Aristotle's logic into the Islamic intellectual environment led to creating what 
was termed "the linguistic obstacle in Aristotle's logic." This concept raised disparities 
regarding structure and meaning in the Arabic and Greek languages. Ibn Rushd 
succeeded in addressing this obstacle through his commentaries on Aristotle's logic. Ibn 
Rushd had a great appreciation for Aristotle's philosophy, and this admiration was 
reflected in Averroes's treatment of questions of logic and his adoption of Aristotle's 
views on these issues. (Borrowman, 2008). 
To examine al-Baghdadi’s ISIS rhetoric, Aristotle's methodology was chosen to 
fit with key appeals to the Holy Quran and the hadiths of the Prophet Muhammad. The 
Qur'an is a 1,400-year-old book with the inherent goal of persuading people to enter 
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Islam. The rhetoric of the Qur’an depends on warnings, promises, and carrots. The Arab 
tribes agreed that the Prophet was a virtuous and righteous man, who did not drink wine 
and engage with women and was honest. Indeed, these attributes supported the Prophet’s 
position as a gentleman calling for a new religion, raising slogans of self-cleansing, and 
calling for good deeds. He proclaimed the avoidance of ugly deeds such as lying, theft, 
and adultery, and reminded people of the greatest reward, heaven. The Prophet 
Muhammad succeeded in spreading Islam based on the Qur’an’s discourse and the 
ongoing, persuasive processes backed by hadiths that explain the Qur’an’s approach. 
Today more than 1.2 billion people have converted to this Islam. 
 Under these auspices, al-Baghdadi adopted the approach of the Prophet 
Muhammad, and as such, al-Baghdadi ’s speeches were mainly supported by the verses 
of the Qur’an and the hadiths of the Prophet Muhammad. al-Baghdadi ’s appeals were for 
a return to the natural Islam of Muhammad, and he likened a strategy for a state to that of 
the Prophet. He raised the slogan of restoring the glories of credible Islam. On his first 
appearance, al-Baghdadi's words wore the same clothes that those of the Prophet 
Muhammad wore. Al-Baghdadi's speech even mimicked the speeches of the Prophet 
Muhammad using the same words. Typically, al-Baghdadi's rhetoric was a classic based 
on the Qur'an and the Prophet Muhammad.  
Aristotle believed that discourse produces persuasion through the speaker's 
personality, the emotional state of the listener, or the content of the argument and 
slogans. Aristotle affirms that the discourse is closely related to dialectic, and in some 
respects, the aim is to attack or defend an argument. Others, through the years, argued 
that rhetoric is necessary only for those who want to hide the truth from their audience, 
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and these scholars suggested that a person who states the truth does not need rhetorical 
tools. However, Aristotle believed that even those with just and real ideas needed 
rhetorical tools to persuade an audience. Aristotle believed that a spokesperson would be 
more persuasive by choosing the persuading sides of a particular issue.  
 The choice of rhetorical lens depends on the rhetorical critic's appreciation of the 
piece he wants to analyze. "The rhetorical critic is free to see the discourse historically, 
relatively, publicly or in isolation," according to Black (quoted in Abel, 1993). 
Burgchardt (2005) also held that Aristotle's Rhetoric is one of the essential books 
influencing rhetorical scholars through history. He holds that Aristotle is relied upon by 
scholars in most rhetorical treatises, and argued that Aristotle's definition of rhetoric 
means that it is not a specific technique with fixed procedural rules but merely the ability 
to find elements of persuasion in a particular speech. Aristotle also noted that rhetorical 
speech is not limited in scope by the actual means of persuasion used, but can contain all 
the means of persuasion available to the speaker, whether all the means are used. 
Aristotle intended that scholars consider the content of the speaker, what the situation 
calls for, and the resources are available. This process refers to a careful analysis of the 
situation motivating the discourse, the surrounding circumstances, and the problem the 
discourse was intended to solve. Through scholarly reviews of the rhetorical approaches 
in 20th and 21st century America, Burgchardt (2005) found that Black noted that the 
prevailing form of rhetorical criticism was neo-Aristotelianism. Black supported the 
argument by stating that about 38% of essays in the seminal work “A History and 
Criticism of American Public Address” were fundamentally derived from the Aristotelian 
study of rhetoric:  
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The proportion of neo-Aristotelian essays becomes even more striking when we 
note that of the twenty-five essays [of 48 totals] . . . employ only one or two of 
Aristotle's canons to serve for the entire critical apparatus, interpretation, or 
appraisal and some are appreciations, eulogies, or of dubious character (p.55). 
Burgchardt (2005) also pointed out that “Only eight of the essays attempt an examination 
and appraisal of rhetorical discourses by the employment of techniques which are 
singular or which represent unconventional interpretations or applications of traditional 
rhetoric.” Thus, Black argues that the dominant form of rhetorical criticism in the US was 
neo-Aristotelian. Based on the previous, I believe Aristotle's methodology is quite fitted 
to analyzing the classical Islamic discourse of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, which relies 
mainly on the Qur’an and the hadiths of the Prophet. 
Researchers agree in the fields of literature and rhetoric that the first theories of 
discourse extend long ago to before the first centuries, but the methodologies or 
guidelines that researchers use to analyze rhetorical texts did not exist before the 
twentieth century. In 1925, Wichelns identified some of the basic features of the first 
method of rhetorical criticism, or what is known as the neo-Aristotelian approach. 
Wichelns defined the speech as a mechanism of persuasion, and he perceived the need to 
distinguish between literary criticism and rhetorical criticism. Wichelns considered 
rhetorical criticism as a unique means because it concentrates on the influences of 
discourse on the audience. Alternatively, literary criticism is more concerned with 
identifying the aesthetic attributes associated with the written texts. 
The Neo-Aristotelian methodology provides a reasonable explanation of the 
methods of persuasion and answers why a discourse was convincing and why a speech 
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influenced people. The rhetorical strategy offers a hidden vision in the discourse that the 
average person does not realize. The traditional or neo-Aristotelian approach is based on 
the ancient Greek and Roman critics. The approach assumes that the discourse acts to 
expose rational and sincere appeals to the masses. In this methodology, the critic focuses 
on the ethical, logical, and motivational elements in which the discourse works to achieve 
persuasion. According to Black's perception of the value of Aristotle's methodology, it is 
appropriate to analyze al-Baghdadi's radical discourse, in which he uses appeals to show 
himself as a virtuous cleric who promises a great future for Muslim youth. Consequently, 
it is not easy to apply the narrative, feminist, or other methodology to al-Baghdadi 's 
speech because the feminist methodology is suitable for feminist rhetoric and movement. 
In other words, each rhetorical methodology fits better with varying specific rhetorical 
types. 
Every critic or researcher has a specific view of the artifact; in other words, there 
is no right or wrong reading (Foss, 2004). Neo-Aristotelian rhetorical criticism consists of 
two constituents: historical and judicial. First, the critic seeks historically to reconstruct 
the context within which the rhetoric was operative. Second, the critic attempts to judge 
the effectiveness of the speaker's use of the principles of rhetoric in accomplishing a goal 
(Hendrix, 1968). 
Aristotle's rhetoric suggested three critical pathways to persuasion; the methods of 
ethos, pathos, and logos. Aristotle defined these modes of persuasion as (a) ethos or the 
credible personal characteristics of the speaker, (b) pathos or the emotion the speaker 
projects to the listeners, and (c) logos or the use of compelling arguments to support facts 
and make a specific case (Allen, 2007). In Aristotle’s’ framework, ethos is the public 
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assessment of the credibility of appeals made by an authority figure, such as political, 
lawyer, cleric, and others. As suggested above, pathos is an emotional appeal that 
convinces and provokes the audience; for example, these appeals might be in the form of 
metaphors, descriptions, or allegations of injustice (Tollefson, 2017). 
Among the components of ethos, which include language and credibility, the 
enthymeme is the main component of the logical appeals for the speech. Enthymemes use 
implied or hinting phrases in the speech that can convey the message without directly 
speaking them. The point becomes clear and understandable to the listener, even if it is 
not pronounced directly. It is considered vital because it allows the audience to supply 
conclusions and clarify the speaker's argument or hypothesis. The method is standard in 
politics, advertising, and literary discourse. It is an effective method used to persuade the 
audience through suggestion or implication. Aristotle deemed the enthymeme the main 
body of persuasion. The focus of his methodology is on the internal elements of a 
discourse. Using these components, discourse is examined using the core qualities such 
as ideas, organization, reasonable use of language, and delivery (Urbanski, 2016). 
Through the analysis of al-Baghdadi 's speeches, I expect to see these elements of al-
Baghdadi 's speeches. Al-Baghdadi was very interested in persuasion and would use 
many such arguments and rhetorical elements to persuade the audience. 
 Aristotle’s methodology focuses on the persuasive elements of a discourse. When 
reviewing the artifact, the researcher should answer five key points to read the artifact 
accurately. The first point concerns invention. How was the artifact built? What is the 
argument? Does the piece focus on emotion, logic, or credibility? The second point is, 
how is the artifact arranged and organized? In other words, what is its structure? Point 
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three concerns style: what language was used? Is the piece creative or lacking inspiration, 
or is it professional and sophisticated? The fourth point is, did the rhetoric seem to be in 
control? The issue of control includes a review of awareness and ability. The fifth point 
includes the connection between speaker and audience and how the speech was delivered 
and the circumstances surrounding the speech. In this case, an analyst must consider the 
speaker’s attractiveness, insight, confidence, and quality, as well as other traits (Urbanski, 
2016). In a study in which the traditional Aristotelean methodology was applied to public 
diplomacy in the mixed-motive situation, Zhang (2010) concentrated on five elements in 
the speeches which were included in the discussion. These were an invention, 
organization, style, delivery, and memory. These are the same elements to be analyzed in 
the rhetoric of the leader of ISIS. The analysis also focused on credibility appeals and 
ethics in the speech.  
The Gamal Abdel Nasser Rhetorical Style 
I also invoke the rhetorical style of Gamal Abdel Nasser, who ruled Egypt from 
the years 1952 to 1961. He was known for his speeches, which dazzled the Arab world. 
Nasser had a militant Arab ideology and supported Arab nationalism with a socialist 
approach. Nasser perceived the necessity of uniting the Arab countries as one entity, i.e., 
the United States of Arabia. This concept of an Arab state aligned with al-Baghdadi 's 
later vision of creating an Islamic empire. Nasser succeeded in persuading Syria and 
Yemen to join Egypt under one country and flag. Some suggested that Libya tried to join 
this union under the leadership of Muammar Gaddafi, who supported the ideology of the 
Nasserists. However, the Arab Union quickly ended after a military coup in Syria 
resulted in its separation from Egypt. Abdel Nasser raised the slogans of social justice as 
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a banner for his rule, and these slogans became associated with his biography and that of 
his country that sought the elimination of class so they might start transforming the 
world.  
Under the slogans of social justice, Nasser enjoyed widespread popular support 
and imposed tight restrictions on the rich. He implemented many socialist laws, such as 
free healthcare and education. These are the same ideas that al-Baghdadi later had. For 
example, al-Baghdadi ordered that gold money be distributed to all followers of his state 
monthly, and he also ordered free healthcare and education while using the slogans of 
fighting corruption and classism, and upholding social justice. Nasser’s speeches were 
directed to all Arab nations and not only to the state of Egypt. This is similar to al-
Baghdadi's calls for the Islamic nation. An interesting device that Gamal Abdel Nasser 
used in his speeches was pronouns that imply a plural form for the speaker, such as “We, 
we are accustomed, we are believers, we can all ...” His speeches were impressive, and it 
was said that the Arabs did not love any person like Nasser. 
The principles of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s revolution focused on the association of 
the Egyptian national identity with the Arab identity, and that should be no preference for 
the identity of the homeland over the identity of the Arab nation. Secondly, he 
emphasized linking Arab identity and Islam as a religion to unite the Arabs. That is why 
Abdel Nasser saw himself as an Arab and Islamic leader, not only as president of Egypt. 
The third principle is the centrality of the Palestinian cause in the Arab struggle to 
liberate the state from the Israeli occupation. The fourth underlying tenet was Nasser’s 
preoccupation with the hardships of the poor and those with limited income; he believed 
in improving the conditions of the poor and considered them equal to the rich. He sought 
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not to let the poor die poor; for example, Nasser granted farmers free lands and accessible 
loans to develop agriculture and Egyptian pastoral production by nationalizing all state 
institutions. Abdel Nasser had a conceptual framework for building an independent Arab 
society that did not need to rely on the West while achieving social justice. He created 
strong relations with the Soviet Union and pushed back relations with the West because 
he believed the Western countries subverted the destiny of Arab nations. These principles 
were embodied in Nasser’s speeches, and thus, his speeches were influential; Arabs 
tended to be “attached to” their radios when Nasser gave a speech. 
Identification in Rhetoric  
Burke's identification methodology restructures the idea of communication with 
the public. Identity has always been a key principle in Burke's interpretations of 
eloquence. For a speech to persuade the audiences, the message of interest to the public 
must be defined. Day Dennis (1960) argued that Burke's approach was critical not 
because Burke viewed identity as a means of persuasion, but because he considered it the 
only way to achieve persuasion. According to Burke, the identification process is focused 
on "identifying " the discourse with the audience. He assumed that the more individuals’ 
ideas and arguments are in line with the audience, then the more they might identify 
strongly and feel a connection to the leader. Identification builds bridges. Fundamentally, 
identification is a way of considering the audience's awareness and appeal. The discourse 
must project content that is congruent with the audience and attracts them such that they 
identify with the speaker, and identification is the most powerful means to attract and 
persuade them. Burke believed that the rhetorician might succeed in shifting public 
thinking toward a specific opinion. However, it can only succeed by conveying ideas in 
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ways that motivate the audience to accept an opinion as consistent with their own. When 
speeches tailor the message to an audience, then the public can be encouraged at the 
moment to accept what is presented. The acceptance depends on what is being presented 
and its consistency with what the public wants (Head,2016). There are three tools of 
identification of Burke: material, idealistic, and formal. Head (2016) described Burke’s 
perspective of “[m]aterial identification results from goods, possessions, and things.” The 
perspective stems from material well-being and economic standing. Head further 
described Burke’s idealistic identification as it "results from ideas, attitudes, feelings, and 
values." Social norms of a cultural group and individuals’ expression of these underlie 
the idealistic identification. Finally, Littlejohn held that Burke’s ''[f]ormal identification 
results from the form or arrangement of the act'' (p. 17). 
Burke chose identification as a critical term to distinguish his rhetorical 
perspective from the tradition of persuasion. However, this focus on identification does 
not mean that Burke rejected the traditional focus on persuasion (Bernard, 1999). Burke 
suggested that interactions in the contemporary world are more complex than persuasion 
as intentional and deliberate actions directed by discourse to a specific and known 
audience. In Burke’s definition, identification provides a rich resource for those 
interested in convincing or joining a group. Burke perceived that if an individual is 
isolated, driven to perfectionism, and in a turbulent state, they can become vulnerable to 
those who practice the art of influence for good and evil (Bernard, 1999). One of the 
parties must recognize the person who is a target for persuasion (Burke, 1969). Burke 
stated that identity is a part of the discourse of persuasion when arguing that common 
interests underlie identity. Burke indicated that when some individuals begin to identify 
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with a group, then divisiveness is created. Because individuals are engaged in conflicts 
with other individuals and groups, identifying with the discourse becomes a form of 
persuasion; it may even become the most persuasive rhetoric. Also, common interests 
serve to persuade and overcome conflicts with others through mutual identification 
(Bernard, 1999). Burke has successfully designed a broad and useful approach to various 
rhetorical theories that concern how people use language within social contexts. The 
approach includes language as more than logical discourse and grammatical structure. In 
other words, Burke's rhetorical system introduces grammar rules that depict the dynamic 
aspects of creative expression. Burke's rhetorical theory provides a systematic way of 
tracking the importance of distinct ways of speaking in various contexts (Hansen, 1996). 
 Ehninger (1975) argued that the focus on rhetoric as persuasion is inhumane and 
criticized the use of an old form of rhetorical criticism, suggesting that it turns people into 
subjects manipulated through words. Scholars considered that contemporary rhetorical 
theory offers a more holistic context for studying how people use language in all aspects 
of social life, including the study of discourse as a means of solving social problems 
(Hauser, 2002). The discourse persuades others to think as they believe and work as they 
prefer (Hogan, 2012). 
 Burke presumed that divisions occur because humans are born as individuals, but 
each person seeks to form an identity through communication. Under the perspectives of 
contemporary rhetoric, Burke argued that human interaction is more complicated than the 
term of persuasion and defined the process of identification is more effective for 
understanding human communication (Quigley, 1998). Burke's approach to identification 
proposed a new perspective on the study of discourse within groups. Burke's views 
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extended to the aesthetic qualities of words because he treated words as real entities. 
Conceptually, the view of words as entities is consistent with contemporary rhetorical 
theories in which knowledge is socially constructed (Heath, 1984).  
Charland (1987) held that discourse based on identification is continuous and not 
restricted to an isolated speech; it is part of a socialization discourse. According to Sloane 
(2011), Poite, the founder of the constitutive rhetoric theory, assumed that language 
creates a collective identity for the audience. That is, symbols, literature, and narrative 
are all critical to the process of collective identity. This sort of discourse requires action 
to strengthen identity, and it includes the art of character formation, community, culture, 
and identity. There are two ways to convince the public that they are part of identity 
persuasion and deceptive manipulation. Using persuasion, speakers try to persuade the 
audiences of a collective identity, honestly and frankly. By using manipulation and 
deception, they create a sense of belonging to an identity (Cheney, 1983; Sloane, 2011). 
Postmodern rhetoricians have used ideology, a coherent set of beliefs that people use to 
understand events and identify others. Ideologies can shape individuals’ identities, but 
these identities are not stable (Hogan, 2012). Charland (1987) stated that the existence of 
ideological themes in discourse strengthens identity, and hence, the impact of the 
discourse. Nevertheless, collective identity is uncertain and changeable regarding its 
borders, nature, and members, making controlling it nearly impossible.  
 Rhetorical scholars assume that Black's concept of the second person has 
contributed to analyzing the shared beliefs and values imagined between the speaker and 
the audience. The “second person” means that the persons in the audience obtain another 
identity through the speech. (Keith & Lundberg, 2008). Researchers and scholars must 
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analyze the imagined beliefs and values shared by the speaker and the audience. The 
discourse influences the audience and moves them from one identity to another during 
the speech. The assumption of another identity is called the second person (Black, 1970). 
The second identity is not age, temperament, or different position; it is rooted in ideology 
(Black, 1970). In a rhetorical study, Muñiz (2012) applied Burke's methodology and 
definition of rhetoric to understand the motivation of the fictional character, Dr. Who. 
The analysis initially focused on Dr. Who’s attempt to find his identity and girlfriend. 
The author explained, 
Granted, the basic plot of the episode is evident as the viewer can see that The 
Doctor is searching for his identity, his soon-to-be companion Amy is as well; we 
hardly need Burke for that. What we need Burke for is analyzing what this surface 
level, and the explicit plot, does symbolically which, in this case, opens the door 
to establishing consubstantiality with the audience. (p. 46) 
Dr. Who then begins the journey of searching for factors common to himself as well as 
those people around him. Muñiz describes, “Burke wrote that identification fuels all 
motivation and links people between themselves and others, something that DW seems to 
do very well and, in turn, create the opportunity to influence the audience” (p. 46). Thus, 
Muñiz’s example illustrated that Burke’s definition feeds all the emotional impulses and 
drives some rhetors to seek to connect with the others. As another example, in a 2015 
article titled “Power & persuasion: constructing identity in religious communications, 
Nairn et al. (2015) employed Burke's methodology to analyze some Greek Orthodox 
church speeches to members of the diaspora to preserve the identity of the members. The 
authors relied on identification in Burke's theory. These authors stated: 
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Cheney’s (1983) rhetorical identification typology provides tools for exploring 
the identity construction that occurs in persuasive communication. The typology 
operationalises Burke’s (1969) theories of identification, which are based on the 
concept of ‘consubstantiality’” (p. 21), and derives from an idealistic view of the 
power of communication to bring about cooperation. Burke (1969) suggested that 
rhetors could achieve identification using three main ways by (a) creating 
common ground with the audience, (b) encouraging the disassociation of groups 
from one another, and (c) subtly merging the interests of disparate groups and the 
rhetor under an “assumed we”. Cheney’s (1983) typology deploys all three of 
Burke’s strategies of identification, and includes a fourth category: unifying 
symbols. In this paper, we understand the typology as a tool-in-trade for 
practitioners of persuasion (p 3). 
In summary, Burke's approach of identification proposed a new perspective on the 
study of discourse within groups. Burke's views extended to the aesthetic qualities of 
words because he treated words as real entities. Burke argued that human interaction is 
more complicated than the term of persuasion and defined the process of identification as 
more useful for understanding human communication.  
Social identity theory applied to rhetoric. According to social identity theory, we 
categorize people into groups and believe that the group to which we belong is different 
from other groups. People also exaggerate the similarity within their groups. Social 
identity theory includes three stages of mental processes involved in evaluating others 
using the mindset of us versus others. That is, members of a group pit themselves against 
an external group. These steps take place in a specific order; the first stage is 
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categorization, in which people classify things and people to identify and understand 
them. They also position themselves to understand the social environment. For example, 
people use social groups such as Muslim, Christian, and Hindu, and they classify 
unknown people in groups, such as Black and White, student, and teacher. They expect 
that classifying others is useful in identifying and understanding others. Similarly, people 
discover things about themselves when considering their membership in a category. 
Often people determine appropriate behavior based on the criteria of the groups to which 
they belong (Scheepers & Ellemers, 2019; Yingrui & Bin, 2006).  
The second stage is social identification. Usually, people adopt the social identity 
of the group with which they identify for themselves. For example, if a person identifies 
himself as black, he then sympathizes with issues related to race, racism, social 
grievances, and systemic racism. Also, if someone classifies himself as a Muslim, he 
sympathizes with all the injustices toward Muslims. There is an emotional significance 
when identifying a person with a group, and self-esteem is associated with the 
individual’s group identity. The third stage in social identity is social comparison. After 
people classify themselves as part of a group and identify the group, they compare that 
group with other groups. For individuals to remain in a group in which they have pride, 
they need to compare their group with other groups positively. This comparison process 
is essential for understanding bias. Once two groups compare themselves as competitors, 
this leads to intensifying competition among individuals within each group to maintain 
self-esteem based on belonging. Thus, competition between groups is not a competition 
for resources and a consequence of competing identities (Scheepers, & Ellemers,2019) 
(Yingrui, & Bin, 2006). (McLeod, 2019). 
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There are identifiable links between Burke’s concept of identity and social 
identity theory. Burke asserted that the speech is ineffective unless the audience identifies 
with the speaker and the audience. Burke's concept concerns the common ground 
between the speaker and the audience. Social identity theory holds that individuals 
sympathize with issues of the groups to which they belong; for example, individuals 
exaggerate the similarities between one group and overestimate the differences between 
their group and others. Individuals are influenced by the issues of their groups and 
society, and some seek the feeling of superiority they gain by defending their group from 
other rival groups. These are concepts that al-Baghdadi focused on because he relied on 
the Muslims' yearning to unite under one state and restore the Islamic empire. 
Summary of Methods 
In this study, I applied traditional or neo-Aristotelian approaches that originate 
from ancient Greek and Roman critics. Bizzell and Herzberg (2001) argued that the 
history of rhetoric is the story of a long struggle to understand the relationship between 
discourse, knowledge, communication, as well as the effects and language of rhetoric and 
how people experience it. Aristotle understood and was well-practiced with discourse 
intended as persuasion. (Glynos et al., 2009). A rhetorical methodology can provide a 
clear scope for the study of al-Baghdadi 's rhetoric and recognize how these speeches 
succeed in attracting youth around the world. Rhetorical criticism provides transparent 
methodologies for analyzing al-Baghdadi's rhetoric. According to Gehrke (2009), the use 
of rhetoric is an art, and therefore inconsistent with the scientific methods of analysis. 
However, criticism is also an art and is suitable to examine the rhetorical arts. Kuypers 
(2009) suggested that criticism is a means of generating knowledge. Even as critical 
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thought is required for the scientific method for producing knowledge, it has 
comprehensive and profound potential for use in the analysis of rhetoric. Rhetorical 
criticism is used to study and analyze the structure of discourse, the purposes of words, 
the effect of words on the masses, sources of strength, appeals, and other elements. It is 
an intellectual practice that dates to the era of Plato, i.e., the fourth century BC. By 
improving understanding, a critic can offer practical and rich ways for others to see the 
world. It is through such a critical understanding that scholars produce knowledge about 
human communication. In theory, rhetorical criticism helps us understand and manage 
our interactions with others (Kuypers, 2009). 
 Rhetorical criticism explores the relationship between context and text, and 
because the purpose of the discourse is to be convincing, the level at which the discourse 
in question persuades its audience must be analyzed and then criticized. One guiding idea 
is that rhetorical criticism is a personal perception and is best when less structured than 
the typical scientific method (Kuypers, 2009). Black (1978) argued that critics could best 
use rhetorical methods flexibly and combined with multiple methods. This dissertation 
research relied on rhetorical criticism to analyze the speeches of the ISIS leader. This 
methodology allows disassembling of the rhetoric in detail and understanding of the 
methods of persuasion that Baghdadi uses in rhetoric, given that he ties these to 
interpretations of the Qur’an messages.  
 The dissertation contains the following components in the analysis of al-Baghdadi 
’s rhetoric: the meanings, statements, and metaphors based on classic studies of Arabic 
rhetoric that appeared in al-Baghdadi ’s speeches. Five elements of Aristotle's 
methodology for examining discourse drive the analysis. The first of these elements is 
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invention, which concerns how the artifact and the argument were built. Critics and 
researchers using the Aristotelian approach must then ask added questions that center on: 
does the discourse focus on logic, on emotion, and is it credible? The second of five key 
points are, how is the artifact arranged and organized? In other words, what is its 
structure? Point three concerns style; what language was used? Is the piece creative or 
lacking inspiration, or is it professional and sophisticated? The fourth point is, did the 
rhetoric seem to be in control? The issue of control includes a review of awareness and 
ability. The fifth point includes the connection between speaker and audience and how 
the speech was delivered and the circumstances surrounding the speech. In this case, an 
analyst must consider the speaker’s attractiveness, insight, confidence, and quality, as 
well as other traits (Urbanski, 2016). Throughout al-Baghdadi ’s speeches, the focus was 
on ethos, pathos, and logos, emphasizing his appeals. 
 Another focus of the study was the political and environmental frames from 
which the speeches arose. The circumstances surrounding each speech and its historical 
context are discussed. Thus, the relationship of the speech content to the past and the 
present can be examined. Finally, I plan to consider the audience al-Baghdadi aimed to 
persuade. This examination includes their beliefs and values; for example, what do they 
care about? Furthermore, why are they a target for al-Baghdadi, and why does al-
Baghdadi try to persuade them? What enthymemes will the audience be expected to 
supply? Circumstances such as the occasion and timing of the speech are described in the 
context of al-Baghdadi 's underlying motivations for speeches. Also, Nasserian style 
rhetoric was used as a lens for analysis because Nasser was influential in the Arab world, 
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and he emphasized the slogans of social justice in the Arab nation. In particular, he 
implemented and made promises of healthcare and free education for all.  
 In this study, social identity theory and the concept of identification was applied 
to examine the ISIS leader's appeals and focus on identity in ideological speeches. Burke 
intended the concept as a means of interpreting identity and as a vital tool for persuasion. 
Burke applied this approach to analyze National Socialist German Chancellor Adolf 
Hitler's ideological rhetoric and proposed an explanation for the use of identity as a 
persuasive device (Burke, 1969). Burke’s identification theory remains a popular theory 
of rhetoric, and scholars have used it to interpret key concepts of persuasion (Nairn et al., 
2015). Burke (1969) suggests that to be convincing, the concept of identity must be 
invoked and conveyed until persuasion becomes valid; one of the parties must identify 
with the other so that the persuasion function can work. Furthermore, he stressed that 
words could generate identity in three main ways, the first of which is creating common 
ground with the audiences. Al-Baghdadi stated his goal was to save Muslims from 
division and weakness. In his speech, he sought to unify the Islamic nation and prepare it 
to lead the world. The second is by separating groups from each other. Al-Baghdadi 
proposed that infidels are Muslims’ real enemies and that it is a shame for Arab and 
Islamic governments to ally themselves with the infidels. He encouraged Muslims to 
sever relations with all the infidels, an ideal that he sought to install in a Muslim state. 
The third is by merging the interests of disparate groups. Al-Baghdadi has stated that all 
armed extremist groups must unite under one banner to fight the infidels. In his speeches, 
despite his hostility to al-Qaeda, al-Baghdadi refused to fight that organization and called 




Four speeches were the focus of analysis here. These are the only four speeches 
fully preserved as given by al-Baghdadi and were widely shared via media worldwide, 
especially among Isis members. The four speeches, all delivered in Arabic, were chosen 
because they represent the summit of the rise of ISIS led by al-Baghdadi, and the height 
of al-Baghdadi’s influence before his death, which occurred after his last speech. The 
first speech was a historic declaration of a new country over large areas of Iraq and Syria. 
However, al-Baghdadi's second and third speech followed significant setbacks that the 
organization suffered. In the fourth and final speech, al-Baghdadi appeared publicly after 
the organization lost all the territories it had controlled. In other words, these 
presentations tell the story of the rise and fall of one of the most substantial Islamic 
extremist organizations. 
 The first speech. Al-Baghdadi made his first public appearance when giving a 
speech on June -July, 2014, in the Great Mosque in the Iraqi city of Mosul after ISIS had 
seized the city. In this well-known speech, al-Baghdadi presented two main messages: 
first, a dominant Islamic state must be established based on Islamic identity, and second, 
this goal of an Islamic state could be achieved by continuing jihad and fighting the 
infidels who pose a threat to the Islamic identity. The speech contained a religious 
invitation from a clergyman who considered himself as the leader of the Islamic Ummah. 
At the time, large parts of Syria and much of Iraq were under the control of ISIS, and the 
international coalition against terrorism had not yet been formed. Conditions were 
favorable for al-Baghdadi to expand his power faster than he had expected.  
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 The second speech. Al-Baghdadi’s second speech came two years later, in 
October –November 2016, just after the liberation of Mosul from ISIS, which was the 
most critical loss for ISIS at the time. The speech was preserved as an audio recording 
without appearing in public or on video. Mosul is described as a human reservoir for the 
ISIS organization—it is the largest city in Iraq and inhabited by more than 2 million 
people. The organization was retreating at all levels, and the losses were increasing, but 
ISIS suicide attacks against the Iraqi forces and the Kurdish fighters increased to 
hundreds in Syria and Iraq. 
 The third speech. The third speech of al-Baghdadi came after the organization lost 
most of the lands it controlled. The speech was given in August 2018 and lasted 55 
minutes. Also, it was an audio recording without visual or public appearance. The event 
occurred on Eid al-Adha, the most important holiday for Muslims. The speech was 
motivated by rumors that al-Baghdadi had been killed. Its text is considered the most 
extended letter to be published by al-Baghdadi. During that period, reports revealed the 
emergence of the organization in Iraqi cities even after the organization lost 98% of the 
lands it controlled. However, ISIS appeared to be taking its last breath. 
 The fourth and final speech. In 2019 the self-proclaimed leader of the "Islamic 
State," al-Baghdadi, reappeared in public for the first time since July 2014. The message 
appeared in a video clip sent out to the world, showing that ISIS still existed, and its 
leader was alive. Al-Baghdadi stated that ISIS is determined to intensify attacks across 
the globe. The video was an 18-minute production by Al-Furqan Foundation, which 
specializes in publishing organization messages. Because Muslims celebrate Ramadan 
from May 6th to June 3rd, sending the message for publication before the start of the 
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month of Ramadan meant it was intended to reach an audience at the time when jihadists 
usually mount their attacks and propaganda campaigns. At the beginning of his speech, 
al-Baghdadi welcomed new entrants to the "Caliphate State" in Mali, Burkina Faso, and 
Sri Lanka. Many researchers in the field of extremism believe that this appearance was 
the last before his death. 
This dissertation analyzes these most famous speeches of the ISIS leader from 
2014 until his death in 2019 by focusing on rational and emotional appeals and the 
rhetorical context in which they were delivered in a neo-Aristotelian approach, followed 
by applying the concepts of Nasserian style, identification, and social identity. These 
concepts fit well and are unique lenses to provide a clear understanding of the persuasive 





 – RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FOUR SPEECHES 
Analysis of each speech sets the context for each and then suggests neo-
Aristotelian, Nasserian, and identity/identification elements found in each.  
The First Speech  
 To analyze the content and form of a discourse, the historical context and the 
circumstances of a speech should be explored. For example, the historical setting for the 
rise of al-Baghdadi and ISIS was one of turmoil for the Middle East. Al-Baghdadi had 
become known to Muslims across the area through recorded audio speeches. That is, the 
speech is often considered as the “first” address to the public by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as 
the leader of ISIS but was not his first. Many audio recordings were used to convey al-
Baghdadi’s speeches during the organization’s rise in Iraq, and some of these preceded 
this first speech in which he appeared in public. Thus, the so-called first speech is 
considered the speech that brought al-Baghdadi directly to the public for the first time. 
From the audio recordings, the public could quickly identify his voice and rhetorical 
style. The early victories for the organization prompted the choice of making a physical 
appearance for this specific speech. ISIS had, in the recent past, taken control of vast 
areas in Iraq and Syria, gaining control of territories that exceeded the land areas of Syria 
and Iraq. 
The Middle East and Syria were described as in chaos. Syrians were living in a 
struggle between the dictator Bashar al-Assad and protesters who wanted a better future 
without dictatorship. The Syrian conflict had turned into an armed battle. Many countries 
were involved in supporting one of the parties in this conflict; however, the major lines of 
supporters were Iran and Russia, which chose to support the Assad regime, and the Arab, 
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European and American countries choosing to support the demonstrators. Security 
systems had collapsed in most of Syria, leaving ways for many different armed groups to 
enter the stage. In Iraq, the situation was not better than Syria; protests broke out to call 
for a revolution and a better life. Under these conditions, with the absence of stable 
governments and the collapse of services, Isis emerged and gradually filled the void by 
becoming a unifying organization. Much of the world was preoccupied with the 
devastation in Syria and the massive waves of Syrians who were displaced. Thus, ISIS 
took the opportunity to seize much of the area in disarray using violent tactics, 
oppression, and torture to control the troubled areas. 
 After ISIS came to the fore, countries in the Middle East experienced this 
organization as a broad danger that expanded across the borders of countries. Middle 
Eastern countries considered the organization as a viable threat to all in the region 
without exception. The fears stemmed from the ISIS dogma that Arab regimes were 
agents of the West, and they should be removed. The organization had an appetite to 
expand and control even more land by toppling Arab regimes and taking advantage of the 
Arab Spring. The latter issue is salient because al-Baghdadi sought to take advantage of 
the despair of youth in the region; thus, much of his discourse was aimed at youth. 
During this period, the Iraqi authorities leaked information that al-Baghdadi was killed or 
seriously injured from an airstrike, making his appearance in-person all the more striking 
to his young followers. 
 One of the characteristics of Islamic discourse is that it begins with praise for the 
Lord and the Prophet Muhammad and ends with the same appreciation for the Lord and 
the Prophet Muhammad. The more the speaker praises the Lord and the Prophet 
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Muhammad, the more he draws in and impresses the listeners. Thus, true to expectations 
at the beginning of the sermon, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi praised the Lord and the Prophet 
Muhammad, but importantly, he did so in ways similar to those Osama bin Laden used in 
speeches. In most Islamic speeches, whether in Friday prayers or public speeches, the 
speaker begins with praise because it is a discursive religious practice that began during 
the era of the Prophet Muhammad and continues today. Al-Baghdadi said, 
All praise is due to Allah. We thank him and seek His assistance and His 
forgiveness. O Allah, defend us from the evil of ourselves and the evils of our 
actions. Whoever is guided by Allah will never be misguided, and whoever is 
made lost by Allah will never be guided (Al Baghdadi, 2014) 
However, by invoking the memory of Osama bin Laden, al-Baghdadi created continuity 
with the past cause of al-Qaeda and bin Laden’s discourse directed to youth. 
 With this classical religious and preaching style, al-Baghdadi focused on building 
credibility as a religious man, preacher, and expert in Islamic teachings, who wanted to 
display virtuous morals by appealing to the Qur’an and the Prophet Muhammad and 
linking them to his new rhetoric. In Islamic teachings, presenting an impression of being 
religious is key to a person holding integrity and credibility before the public. In other 
words, the more religious persons portray themselves, the more profound the impact of 
persuasion on the listeners. Using these emotional appeals, al-Baghdadi was keen to show 
people that he is the opposite of the Arab regimes, which he presented as secular and full 
of corruption. Al-Baghdadi used the duality of truth and falsehood by summoning his 
image as a pious cleric who could lead his new state in a strictly religious approach 
against corruption, tyranny, and secular regimes. Al-Baghdadi viewed the Arab regimes 
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mired in corruption and as having no legitimacy. Thus, people revolted against them, as 
happened in the Arab Spring. 
 Consequently, al-Baghdadi portrayed these regimes as evil and positioned himself 
as a reformer and leader who can fight these evils and chart a better future. In this 
presentation, he used the style of speech, as did Gamal Abdel Nasser; al-Baghdadi 
directed the speech to a broader audience, in this case, the Islamic nation, just as Abdel 
Nasser aimed beyond just the state of Egypt by directing speeches to Muslims in the Arab 
nations. Al-Baghdadi used the same slogans that Nasser promoted, with themes such as 
social justice, fighting corruption, and concern for the youth and the working class, which 
are attractive messages in the Arab world. He expressed, “O Muslims, reaching Ramadan 
is a great blessing and great grace from Allah. The beginning of the month is mercy, its 
middle is forgiveness, and its end is protection from the fire “(Al Baghdadi 2014). He 
also implied the need to change wealth distribution among the population and provide 
free education and healthcare. Muslims do not believe in taxes, and there are hadiths 
about the Prophet Muhammad in which he cautioned about taxes. Instead of taxes, a 
condition of Islam is that money is paid by merchants and the rich to benefit the poor. 
These funds are called zakat and are paid annually in the month of Ramadan.  
 Al-Baghdadi continued the talk by recalling the virtues of Ramadan, a holy month 
for Muslims. During Ramadan, Muslims are obliged to fast from dawn to sunset for the 
30 days. The Prophet Muhammad stressed that during this month, Muslims must be 
careful with acts of worship so they might receive God’s rewards. Following this 
tradition, al-Baghdadi used many Qur’anic verses and prophetic hadiths urging Muslims 
to give their best in this month. In the time of the Prophet Muhammad, Ramadan was 
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considered the month of victories because he defeated his opponents in the first battle, 
and it was in Ramadan. Therefore, al-Baghdadi and other extremists use these older 
oratory practices to describe modern era victories to revive these older traditions for the 
audience. As al-Baghdadi mentioned the virtues of Ramadan and the work of worship, he 
was linking Ramadan to jihad by connecting the call to jihad with the Prophet 
Muhammad’s actions when fighting his opponents. He described Ramadan, 
It is a month in which for Allah we are protected from hell, and this is every night 
– nights during which the marketplace of jihad is opened. The Messenger, Allah’s 
peace and blessings be upon him, would hold in it the brigades and arm the armies 
to fight the enemies of Allah to do jihad against the polytheists (Al Baghdadi, 
2014) 
Al-Baghdadi was deliberately using religion to convince Muslims to join ISIS by 
comparing the Prophet Muhammad’s approach to his, which included running the ISIS 
state as based on jihad. In this example, al-Baghdadi demonstrated the concept of identity 
by creating common ground with the public and speaking about the virtues of Ramadan 
and its importance to Muslims.  
 Al-Baghdadi used an enthymeme by declaring Ramadan as the month of jihad and 
mentioned that during Ramadan, the Prophet Muhammad had prepared armies to fight 
the enemies of God and non-Muslims. Al-Baghdadi was leading the audience to conclude 
that they must join ISIS during Ramadan to fight against the enemies of God and the non-
Muslims because their reward is doubled during this time. The historical event represents 
the Prophet Muhammad’s time for preparing for jihad. The message was implicit that if a 
person is a Muslim and a lover of the Prophet Muhammad, then they should join ISIS and 
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declare jihad against the enemies of Allah. Recently, jihad has raised considerable 
controversy among Muslim scholars, especially concerning its conditions, motives, and 
timing. In his narrative, al-Baghdadi needed to resolve the issue and emphasize that jihad 
is one of the constants of Islamic identity; he considered it the first defense of the Islamic 
identity of external threats. In this slogan, al-Baghdadi mentioned the virtues of jihad and 
the necessity of fighting non-Muslims to protect the Islamic identity from threats. 
 Al-Baghdadi took these implicit messages further and launched a new appeal to 
Muslims that he explicitly supported using verses of the Qur’an. Al-Baghdadi simplified 
the logic he used to sway the audience to join ISIS by convincing people that God created 
them to believe him and establish his religion. Al-Baghdadi further declared that God had 
ordered the fight against enemies and jihad to achieve God’s goal and establish religion 
linked to al-Baghdadi. Again al-Baghdadi used an enthymeme that when people engage in 
jihad or fight along with ISIS, they abide by Allah’s orders. Therefore, they are moving 
away from the category of sinners who do not care about Allah’s orders.  
 Al-Baghdadi extended the argument for forming a new country by stating that 
power is the key to applying Islamic law as God has ordered Muslims to follow; thus, 
holding power serves Islamic law. This discourse began the official declaration from al-
Baghdadi that the new state will differ from secular and corrupt Arab regimes. He 
emphasized that in the new state, Islamic law will be applied vigorously, thus, making his 
call to extremists and hardliners to support the formation of this state. Al-Baghdadi stated 
that the basis of religion is a book that directs and a sword to support the book; 
O people, the religion of Allah, blessed be He, is not established and this goal for 
which Allah created us is not achieved but by empowering the Shariah of Allah 
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and being judged by it and establishing the restrictions, and this is only done with 
power and authority. This is the establishment of the religion: a Book that guides 
and a sword that supports (Al Baghdadi, 2014). 
In this message, al-Baghdadi emphasized the sword because it was an important symbol 
for Muslims during the reign of the Prophet Muhammad, who triumphed over his 
opponents and spread Islam. These statements were al-Baghdadi’s attempts to link his 
approaches to those of the Prophet Muhammad directly.  
 Al-Baghdadi described the actions of ISIS; he began by telling the story of the 
group’s decisive victories and widespread control over parts of Syria and Iraq. He pointedly 
referred to Syrians and Iraqis as brothers. In this story, al-Baghdadi invoked the symbolism 
of brothers in Islam and the need to support and help brothers in their jihad and struggle. 
Al-Baghdadi developed the argument by describing that his jihadist strategy successfully 
achieved significant victories on the ground after many years of jihad and patience. He 
resounded that ISIS achieved their most important goal: creating the so-called Islamic 
caliphate and the appointment of an imam for the state, who would be al-Baghdadi. He 
described these actions, specifically jihad and the establishment of the caliphate state, as 
religious duties for all Muslims. Al-Baghdadi was creating a foundation for his country by 
demanding the support of all Muslims. He insisted they demonstrate their support by 
denouncing Muslims who disregarded their “duty” to join him. These messages were an 
implicit call for jihad and to join the new caliphate state that he founded on behalf of 
Muslims, thusly, positioning himself as a caliph of Muslims.  
 Extremist Muslims believe that there will be a caliphate state, a large country 
composed of all the Islamic countries. Al-Baghdadi focused their belief that the time was 
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now to create this so-called central state based on the prediction of the Prophet 
Muhammad. Playing on these beliefs, al-Baghdadi urged the audience to support the 
caliphate state that he established using the words of the Prophet Muhammad. In these 
passages of the speech, al-Baghdadi strengthened his position as a virtuous man entrusted 
with much responsibility, that is, the management of the new caliphate. To emphasize his 
commitment and need for the assistance of others, al-Baghdadi insinuated that the task of 
heading the caliphate was a plague and a challenge he did not want:  
I have been plagued with this great matter, plagued with this responsibility, and it 
is a heavy responsibility. I was placed as your caretaker, and I am not better than 
you. So, if you found me to be right then help me, and if you found me to be 
wrong then advise me and make me right and obey me in what I obey Allah 
through you. If I disobey Him then there is no obedience to me from you. (Al 
Baghdadi, 2014). 
By emphasizing the difficulties, al-Baghdadi puts forth an image of an ordinary person 
called to duty. The aim was to address the likely questions from the masses concerning 
his background and qualifications to be the caliph of Muslims. Al-Baghdadi was begging 
the question: what is the difference between him and the leaders of the Arab regimes? In 
his rhetorical response, al-Baghdadi humbled himself by stating he is no better than 
ordinary people, and he went further to indicate he would not invent a new constitution or 
governance—he intended to rely on God and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. 
He explained that the aim was to apply Islamic law as the Prophet Muhammad did, an 
approach that Muslims believe is successful. To identify himself with the tradition of 
transfer of power within Islam, al-Baghdadi repeated the saying of leader Abu Bakr, who 
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was appointed leader of Muslims after the Prophet Muhammad died. In an approach to 
project the image of a humble man, he called on Muslims to support him if he did the 
right things and advise him if he made mistakes. In this display of faux humility, al-
Baghdadi appears as a virtuous man as he attempts to persuade Muslims by linking his 
administrative state to God and calling Muslims to obey him as a caliphate only when he 
follows God’s orders, but not when he violates Allah’s laws. These words are intended to 
guarantee Muslims that al-Baghdadi would be a virtuous leader who differs from the 
leaders of the Arab regimes. Al-Baghdadi then continues the process of persuasion by 
linking his approach and his state to God’s laws and the teachings of the Prophet 
Muhammed. Al-Baghdadi devoted his speech entirely to Muslims, and his speech was 
directed to create common ground with the public and strengthen social ties with 
Muslims.  
 Through the discourse described above, al-Baghdadi seeks to persuade the masses 
that his leadership of the state reflects God’s orders. He equated the establishing of the state 
as one of the promises of God that he fulfilled withs patience and hard work. The central 
message was that God’s promises are fulfilled for the people who obey Allah and abiding 
by al-Baghdadi’s orders. Al-Baghdadi repeatedly reminded Muslims of the importance of 
jihad for the sake of God, and he incited Muslims to jihad by urging them to be patient and 
steadfast because jihad is hard and tiring. He emphasized that God’s reward is great for the 
mujahedeen, whether in this world or the day after death, the reward will be paradise. 
Recalling the virtues of jihad and its importance to Allah was an explicit attempt to recruit 
more Muslims to join his new country. 
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 Al-Baghdadi then concluded this first sermon with a classic ending that all 
Muslim clerics use in their sermons on Friday. The closing was also used by the Prophet 
Muhammad and his followers in their sermons as well. Al-Baghdadi asked God for 
forgiveness for himself and all Muslims, and he urged Muslims to pray to God with 
confidence that God will fulfill their wishes. Al-Baghdadi then began the second sermon 
(considered part of the same “first speech” he delivered in public) after a few minutes of 
silence, an Islamic tradition applied in Friday prayers. The second sermon is usually 
given more quickly and concisely than the first, and it begins with praise to God and the 
Prophet Muhammad while reminding Muslims of the need to obey God alone and follow 
the orders of the Prophet Muhammad, who facilitates obedience to Allah. In this second 
sermon, Al-Baghdadi did not depart from the tradition to praise God, the Prophet 
Muhammad, and the friends of the Prophet Muhammad and those who applied their 
approach. Then he praises Allah again. 
As the speech progressed, al-Baghdadi started a new appeal to Muslims, 
describing them as servants of Allah, and calling them to establish religion in fear of 
God. He stated the message as:  
There is no god but Allah alone without a partner. He was honest with His 
promise, supported His soldiers, and defeated the Parties alone. There is no god 
but Allah alone without a partner, and loyalty is to Him with the religion even if 
the disbelievers hate it. O worshipers of Allah, establish your religion and fear 
Allah, so that He may dignify you in this world and the hereafter. If you want 




In these words, al-Baghdadi was implicitly suggesting that the Arab regimes do not apply 
the Islamic religion correctly, and do not rightly adhere to it. Al-Baghdadi implies that 
returning to true Islam is the solution to all the problems of Muslims; thus, making a 
vigorous argument that is also used by extremists to recruit Muslims. Al-Baghdadi 
reiterates the use of the term jihad and links it to a right and sound life, and making clear 
it is one of God’s orders that should not be ignored. He then stated that Allah has called 
for the unification of Muslims and used this to invoke an argument to form an Islamic 
state. The argument is consistent with some concepts from social identity theory, i.e., the 
aims of self-restoration and group pride. Al-Baghdadi’s goal for his state was to restore 
the dignity of the Islamic nation. H set out to revive the Muslim sense of belonging to 
Islam rather than nation-states. Al-Baghdadi also exaggerated the differences between 
Muslims and non-Muslims as he called for a fight against them. One of the concepts of 
the social identity theory includes that when categorizing people, a communicator will 
attempt to overstate differences between groups. 
Al-Baghdadi concludes the second sermon (and his first public speech) by 
praying to God to remedy the Muslim issues, which is traditional in Muslim sermons. 
The prayer included that the people asked Allah to correct the circumstances of Muslims, 
and in using this call, al-Baghdadi equates the declaration of a caliphate to correcting the 
miserable situation of Muslims. Al-Baghdadi used a brilliant lyricism to achieve this task, 
which demonstrated his religious background and strengthened his position as a virtuous 
and renewed religious man. Thereby again, he suggested he only wants to support the 
completion of the mission and unite the states of Muslims.  
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Emotional appeals can have powerful effects on message targets. These emotional 
appeals are sometimes used in terrorist propaganda; research on terrorist messaging 
suggests that terrorist actors primarily seek to arouse four emotions: fear, anger, guilt, and 
pride (Braddock, 2020). For example, al-Baghdadi was proud of the mujahideen’s 
achievements in a crushing victory and declared the caliphate state when stating, 
As for your mujahideen brothers, Allah has bestowed upon them the grace of 
victory and conquest, and enabled them, after many years of jihad, patience, and 
fighting the enemies of Allah, and granted them success and empowered them to 
achieve their goal. Therefore, they hastened to declare the Caliphate and place an 
imam, and this is a duty upon the Muslims (Al Baghdadi, 2014). 
In this passage, al-Baghdadi used a strategy of emphasizing pride and strength by 
implying that jihad is a duty for every Muslim. He called for participation in this sacred 
Islamic duty to establish the Caliphate or the Islamic Empire:  
This is a duty upon the Muslims - a duty that has been lost for centuries and 
absent from the reality of the world and so many Muslims were ignorant of it. The 
Muslims sin by losing it, and they must always seek to establish it, and they have 
done so, and all praise is due to Allah (Al Baghdadi, 2014). 
Al-Baghdadi’s choice of his first appearance at the mosque and Friday prayers is closely 
linked to his ethos as a religious man trying to establish a religious state with values 
distant from corruption. He only mentioned other Arab regimes by insinuation and did 
not directly criticize them. He was interested in the political gains that could be made 
from the speech than specific criticisms that might lead to reform within existing states. 
The speech consisted of many appeals to Muslims, including emotional appeals by 
 
78 
calling for doing good and acting obediently. As he declared the so-called caliphate, he 
credited his jihad and his followers for the many years of persistence needed to reach the 
goal and pledged to apply the sword of justice to everyone in the new state, all while 
promoting self-image. To make clear the message in his speech, he made a public 
appearance to declare a caliphate. When making emotional appeals, such as calling for 
jihad and supporting the new state established by ISIS, al-Baghdadi projected pride in his 
achievements. His message also focused on inciting jihad using evidence from the Qur’an 
and the words of the Prophet Muhammad, which came in different previous contexts.  
 In this speech, al-Baghdadi sought to enact a role model of Islamic identity and 
emphasized the restoration of dignity for the Islamic nation to persuade the audience. In 
his rhetoric about Ramadan, al-Baghdadi referred to the religious symbolism of the 
month of Ramadan. He wanted to invoke the symbols of Ramadan for the listeners 
because these are cultural symbols unique to Muslims. In this way, al-Baghdadi tried to 
create unity with the listeners. According to Cheney (1983), creating a unity with the 
audience is an essential element of creating common ground, such that he can draw on 
the shared beliefs and perceptions that strengthen his discourse for the audience. 
 Consistent with Aristotle’s canons, the speech did not invent anything new; it was 
a classical religious discourse. As in classical Islamic discourse, he began by praising 
God and the Prophet Muhammad and doing the same. The construction of the speech was 
logical as he began a religious sermon by announcing the establishment of a caliphate 
under his leadership. He also suggested he had great honesty in as much as he did not 
desire to carry out these tasks but felt called by God to do so. He emphasized the virtues 
of jihad and the need to support the caliphate state. By concluding the speech with praise 
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to God, the overall structure of the speech maintained the mood he intended to create in a 
strict and precise method. The arguments were logical and supported by evidence from 
the Qur’an and the words of the Prophet Muhammad. He read from a sheet of paper, and 
although he was gazing at the crowd during the speech, he was careful not to depart from 
the written text to uphold his firmness in presenting the message. He raised his voice to 
create a sense of strength and influence; the tones of his voice changed at several stages 
of the speech, and he used meaningful gestures toward the audience as he mentioned the 
arguments meant to link jihad to the orders of Allah. Overall, the speech was surprisingly 
persuasive, given it was al-Baghdadi’s first appearance in public. The speech propelled 
him as a catalyst for the masses, likely due to his religious eloquence and persuasive 
authority in-person. 
The Second Speech  
 The circumstances surrounding the second speech of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi were 
quite different from those of the first speech. At the time of the second speech, an 
international coalition against terrorism, which was established by the Obama 
administration, launched an intense military campaign to liberate the cities that were 
controlled by ISIS. The coalition forces launched the battle to liberate Mosul in Iraq in 
October of 2016, and large Iraqi areas were liberated. ISIS was gradually collapsing due 
to strikes by the international anti-terrorist coalition. These circumstances were reflected 
in al-Baghdadi’s second speech; thus, this speech differed significantly from the first. 
One key difference from the first speech was that al-Baghdadi did not appear in public. 
The speech was presented in an audio recording distributed to media outlets, the Internet, 
and on the organization’s websites. The recording was 31 minutes long. It was a complete 
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speech and not a sermon for Friday prayers. Al-Baghdadi used the most powerful of 
slogans and forceful emotions to motivate the group members to continue the fight. A 
portion of his speech was also devoted to inciting terrorist attacks on coalition countries 
such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey. The speech was a mobilizing and rallying tool for the 
members of the Sunni community, mainly supporters of the Isis organization, and 
incitement to revolt against all Arab and Islamic governments. The content contrasted 
with his first speech in which he did not mention the Arab regimes. 
 Several things were remarkable in this speech, which is considered the most 
important after his first speech in the Grand Mosque in Mosul two years prior, in which 
he declared the establishment of the caliphate state. Although it was not a sermon, the 
speech began with the classic Islamic beginning of any discourse, which is praise to God 
and the Prophet Muhammad, with mention of verses from the Qur’an and the Prophet’s 
hadiths related to the fighting in that period. The introduction is consistent with all 
religious speeches in which the speaker cites Quranic verses connected to an event or a 
topic that the speaker aims to address. After these opening remarks, Al-Baghdadi quickly 
moved to speak to his supporters, facing the international coalition forces consisting of 
Iraqi militias, Kurdish forces, and a mixture of tribes. He encouraged the followers to be 
patient about jihad and hardship. He called for the use of suicide operations, as he 
appealed to his fighters by describing them as “martyrs convoys” and urged them to turn 
Mosul into “rivers of blood” (Al Baghdadi, 2016).The allegorical use of the river of 
blood referred to a fight to the death. 
 Al-Baghdadi called on the ISIS fighters not to withdraw from Mosul, but to fight 
until their last man. He warned them, “Oh, Mujahideen, beware of being weak from 
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fighting and pushing your enemy.” He added, “The price of staying in your land with 
your pride is a thousand times stronger than the price of withdrawing from it while you 
are humiliated” (Al Baghdadi, 2016).There is an explicit call to continue fighting and not 
to surrender at any cost. Al-Baghdadi blatantly called on his supporters to die rather than 
withdraw and surrender. Al-Baghdadi used emotional appeals to pride and defense of the 
land that belonged to them. Al-Baghdadi’s emotional appeals did enact the key four 
types; fear, pride, anger, and guilt. These types of emotional appeals were most useful in 
recruiting extremists. 
 To boost the morale of the fighters, Al-Baghdadi reminded them of the success in 
declaring a caliphate, which came after bitter fighting. After launching the battle to 
liberate Mosul, he stated, “This raging battle and the all-out war today make us, God 
willing, only a firm belief, and a firm certainty, that all this is only a prelude to victory”  
(Al Baghdadi, 2016).In these phrases, al-Baghdadi attempted to lift morale even though 
the international coalition attack on Mosul included aircraft and tanks, and his supporters 
were fighting with individual weapons. Al-Baghdadi realized that the battle was lost, but 
he urged his followers to fight to the death and not surrender, thus pinning their hopes on 
outlasting their enemies. 
 Al-Baghdadi used the slogans of victimhood and defending the land in the face of 
the aggressors to persuade his followers that they were fighting occupiers and that they 
are protecting their territory. He made a special appeal to suicide bombers, calling on 
them to carry out terrorist operations in non-Muslim countries and those Arab countries 
that participated in the international coalition. He called for “turning the night of the 
infidels into the day,” adding, “O Mujahideen, you must destroy their homes, and make 
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their blood like rivers” (Al Baghdadi, 2016). Al-Baghdadi directed his sympathizers to 
carry out major terrorist operations in the countries participating in the international 
coalition against terrorism. A most important message that al-Baghdadi wanted to convey 
to the coalition was that he could harm these countries through terrorism. 
 Al-Baghdadi called for an invasion of Turkey by declaring war, as well as 
attacking Saudi Arabia. He asked his supporters to show the “fire of anger” at the Turkish 
forces fighting in Syria and to take the battle into Turkey. Al-Baghdadi indicated that on 
that day, Turkey had entered the circle of war and became an enemy. Al-Baghdadi called 
on his fighters to invade and “make its security a scare,” (Al Baghdadi, 2016).which 
references implementing terrorist operations. This speech was the first time al-Baghdadi 
had called for the organization’s fighters and supporters to carry out operations against 
Turkey. He stated, “It entered the circle of your jihad,” adding, “Seek the help of God, 
invade it, and then include it in your fiery conflict zones "(Al Baghdadi, 2016).This call 
foretold a bid to remove Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, his government, and 
the stability of his country. 
 Al-Baghdadi did not forget the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the ruling family. 
He incited his supporters to assassinate princes and police officers, ministers, media 
professionals, and writers in the Kingdom. This threat was new. Bin Laden did not 
threaten writers, journalists, and others the way that al-Baghdadi did. Using this 
provocative language, al-Baghdadi exemplified one of Burke’s identity concepts, i.e., the 
division of groups. He spoke for the first time in a sectarian tongue, which divided the 
Islamic Ummah. He emphasized that the Sunnis, who are most Muslims, neither 
understand nor learned from their mistakes, and due to this, he incited a fight against the 
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Kurdish and the Shiite minorities, who had united with the international coalition against 
ISIS. He also attacked the Sunni countries Saudi Arabia and Turkey, and called for 
fighting against these countries. In doing this, al-Baghdadi divided the Muslim groups 
based on ethnicities and ruling regimes with what he saw as no legitimacy. The calls were 
attempts to justify the fight, even if the targets were Muslims. 
 In another attempt to strengthen the resolve of his fighters, al-Baghdadi stated that 
“the caliphate has not stumbled” (Al Baghdadi, 2016), even after the killing of some of 
the top commanders, specifically Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, al-Baghdadi’s deputy. In 
these words, al-Baghdadi reminded the fighters of the caliphate and that it is still in place 
despite the crusader invasion. In this recording, al-Baghdadi confirmed that the 
organization was waging its fiercest war and stressed it as a fateful war due to the defense 
of its most vital stronghold in Mosul. Al-Baghdadi’s speech appeared to “motivate” his 
supporters, encouraging them to stay and not leave Mosul. 
 As related to Aristotle’s approach, al-Baghdadi’s invention in the discourse was 
apparent as he used rigorous arguments, the most prominent of which was that his 
Islamic state was exposed to an American invasion. The logic was that the property and 
land must be defended with honor rather than the humiliation of surrender. The structure 
or arrangement present in this discourse was a classic arrangement in Islamic discourse. 
The classic style contains an introduction that begins with praise to God and the Prophet 
Muhammad, then the essential main argument or body of content, and finally the 
conclusion, which also ends with praise to God and the Prophet Muhammad.  
 The organization of the speech patterns and use of emotional calls allowed al-
Baghdadi to instruct and persuade the audience to fight to the death with a promise of 
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paradise. The use of Qur’anic verses created concordance between the speech messages 
and the discourse of the Qur’an to convince the masses. The structure of the speech was 
useful to set the audience’s attention, and the tone of al-Baghdadi varied with the verses 
of the Qur’an to present them in higher quality. Overall, Al-Baghdadi’s tone of voice was 
raised when he pleaded with his followers to fight to the death, encouraged them not to 
surrender, and warned of a dangerous fate if they did. In some respects, the speech 
resembled the speeches of Osama bin Laden in the use of Qur’anic verses; however, there 
was a fundamental difference, as al-Baghdadi was proficient in the study of the Qur’an, 
and most of his speech content contained Qur’anic verses recited in a melodious voice. 
This style of delivery and content was not surprising given that al-Baghdadi holds a 
doctorate in Islamic sciences. Al-Baghdadi focused on inciting suicide operations and 
describing the perpetrators as martyrs who sacrifice their lives to defend the caliphate. He 
elevated these fighters to have a significant role in the battles of Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa 
in Syria. 
 Al-Baghdadi attacked Sunni leaders in Iraq, accusing them of practicing “the most 
despicable images of treason” throughout history, criticizing the “Sunnis” as “not 
learning, and attacking their silence, declaring a sectarian war against the members of the 
Shiite community.” The tone of the speech, which seems more similar to a “Friday 
sermon” than a political speech, reflects the problematic circumstance facing the Isis 
organization. At that time, the Iraqi forces, supported by the Kurdish peshmerga forces 
and protected by American air cover, were advancing to remove ISIS from Mosul, the 
center of ISIS activities. However, the speech does not imply that al-Baghdadi was 
agitated or afraid, but rather the opposite. He did not address the Kurds and their role in 
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the war nor details of the course of the battle, and the lack of details could be explained if 
al-Baghdadi was unaware of some events because he was outside Mosul, likely in Syria, 
perhaps in Al-Raqqa city. 
 Al-Baghdadi stressed the need for unity, saying, "The internal conflict is the cause 
of failure, the domination of enemies, and differences are a cause of evil and enmity 
between you” (Al Baghdadi, 2016). Al-Baghdadi concluded his speech on the need to 
unite behind the organization, linking the Sunni majority and armed groups to the future 
of his organization. Burke's concept was used to advocate unification in the face of 
enemies. Al-Baghdadi warned of internal conflicts and abandoning the conflict because it 
is the cause of the domination of enemies and the cause of all evil. Al-Baghdadi realizes 
that the organization is facing a fateful battle, and they must circumvent the leaders and 
obey them. 
The Third Speech  
 Before the third speech, rumors were rampant that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was 
dead because he had not been seen for more than a year. The speech came after the 
complete collapse of ISIS, as the organization lost nearly 98% of the territory it 
controlled. However, the speech coincided with reports of the emergence of groups 
affiliated with ISIS in Iraqi regions such as Diyala, Salah al-Din, and Kirkuk, which the 
organization recently lost. During that period, the organization’s branches in Egypt and 
Afghanistan were more lethal and more active in the months preceding the speech. These 
circumstances suggested that al-Baghdadi decided to abandon the concept of a cohesive 
state and moved to the stage of rebellion while preserving the organization’s identity and 
ideas. Al-Baghdadi recalled the history of the organization’s previous struggle against the 
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US and its success after years of fighting to form a country that extended between Syria 
and Iraq. 
 The third speech issued by al-Baghdadi came almost four years after his first 
famous speech in Mosul. The speech was 55 minutes long and was also only an audio 
recording. In the third speech, al-Baghdadi assumed the strategy of pathos as a last resort, 
as al-Baghdadi carried a sad, unassuming voice that lacked the enthusiasm of the first 
speech. Al-Baghdadi did not mention, as he had in his first and second speeches, the 
concept of the state, the organization’s recent difficulties, and the loss of many of the 
areas under his control. He complained about the international war waged by 
superpowers against his nascent state. Al-Baghdadi used religious terms that were 
popular among his followers to convince them that “We are being destroyed by infidels 
who do not want a strong Islamic state. This injustice creates a new stage of revenge 
against these countries through terrorist actions” (Al Baghdadi, 2018). 
 Al-Baghdadi efficaciously used the concept of identity as he talked about 
Muslims as being subjected to extermination at the hands of non-Muslims. He sought to 
ignite anger and stir awareness of injustice among Muslims. The argument was based on 
one of the concepts of social identity theory: persons who identify with a group, such as 
Muslim or Christian, will sympathize with all issues and grievances of their group. 
Moreover, they will exhibit bias in favor of their group. In this speech, al-Baghdadi 
focused on the notion of an oppressed group being killed and exterminated. Al-Baghdadi 
cast his call for battle as a crusade by invoking the history of the Crusades between 




 Al-Furqan, the media arm of ISIS, published this new speech by al-Baghdadi and 
entitled it “Saberin,” an Arabic word meaning the urge to patience. The message was that 
patience to endure hardships is an Islamic principle. He also wanted to inspire the idea 
that “we will overcome” this difficult stage together. Another implied message to the 
international coalition was that “we are steadfast, and you will not be able to defeat us” 
(Al Baghdadi, 2018). 
 Al-Baghdadi described the enemy of his country as America, which he accused of 
carrying out a malicious policy for years against Islam: “If the examiner looked at the 
truth, he would realize what the protector of the Cross of America had achieved after 
entering the arena of confrontation with the people of Islam for almost two decades” (Al 
Baghdadi, 2018). Al-Baghdadi used an angry tone announcing the imminent end of 
America two decades after its war on Islam: “Now America is living the worst stage in its 
modern history” (Al Baghdadi, 2018). He used the same terminology as found in the 
extremist rhetoric of Osama bin Laden. He wanted to assure his followers that Muslims 
were under attack but would prevail and that the end of America was imminent when he 
stated, “This is not my prediction; this is the statements of American politicians, yes now 
America to the demise, God willing” (Al Baghdadi, 2018). With these words, al-
Baghdadi had responded to Trump’s remarks about the U.S. spending billions of dollars 
in the Middle East and achieving nothing. He commented, “America has returned to hide 
its regret over the money spent in the region and only get a sense of regret and 
stagnation” (Al Baghdadi, 2018).With these words, al-Baghdadi was informing his 
followers that America would withdraw from the region and that this defeat was an 
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achievement of God’s promise to defeat infidels. Using these predictions, Al-Baghdadi 
encouraged his followers not to lose faith. 
 Because the U.S. destroyed al-Qaeda, it has long been the main enemy of 
extremists; thus, the debate about its end impresses extremists and motivates them to 
continue fighting. In his speech, the leader argued the U.S. has, for years, suffered losses 
due to its conflict with Islam. He expressed that the cause of America’s failures is jihad, 
and he injected words in the speech to convince his followers that jihad should continue 
toward the impending goal of defeating America. Al-Baghdadi provided multiple events 
as evidence of America’s imminent defeat. For the first time, he brought up the issue of 
the Turkish-American dispute. He argued that the Turkish refusal to release a U.S. pastor 
is disrespectful to the U.S., which no longer frightens other countries. 
 Al-Baghdadi provided other arguments concerning the decline of the American 
role in the region. He described the Russian-Iranian insurgency in Syria against U.S. 
interests as disregard for American influence. However, this was the point at which al-
Baghdadi contradicted himself. He had long described Russia as a communist state with 
hate against Islam, but he was now in a complicated situation where he was suggesting 
that any enemy of the U.S. is a friend, even if they are anti-Muslim. However, al-
Baghdadi invoked controversy by contradicting his strict religious doctrine. As additional 
evidence of the collapse of the American role, al-Baghdadi invoked North Korea’s 
position and relationship with the U.S., which is unusual in radical Islamic discourse. Al-
Baghdadi remarked, “Even North Korea is showing a lack of commitment to the 
agreement with America,” and he describes America’s behavior as that of “a gangster, a 
sign of America’s decline and inferiority” (Al Baghdadi, 2018).In these statements, al-
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Baghdadi argued that even North Korea’s weak and isolated state could confront America 
amid its inability to respond. He asserted that America no longer intimidates anyone, and 
the reason for this position is the ongoing Islamic jihad. In Islamic extremist discourse, a 
non-Muslim country is seldom praised, and all non-Muslim countries are described as 
enemies. Perhaps al-Baghdadi violated this rule as an attempt to suggest that his recently 
declared state has different ideas for dealing with non-Muslim countries. 
 Al-Baghdadi paid tribute to the efforts of the mujahedeen, “The Mujahedeen 
failed to appease what America dreamed of controlling” (Al Baghdadi, 2018). 
He then argued that Russia’s crusader state had a dispute with America after perceiving it 
was weak and was retreating. Referring to interference in Syria, al-Baghdadi pointed out 
that the crusader countries were all against Islam and served their interests. He said, “I 
am trying to protect your interests from this crusade so you must support me and continue 
jihad.” (Al Baghdadi, 2018)  Al-Baghdadi knew that there was growing anger in the 
Muslim world over Russia’s role in Syria, which protected Syrian dictator Bashar al-
Assad. Muslims recognized the heinous crimes of al-Assad, including the use of chemical 
weapons against his people with the help of Russia. He emphasized the description of the 
crusade for the second time, and he appealed to the religious sense of Muslims by stating 
that “Muslims are insulted, and we must defend our religion and our interests.” As noted, 
he argued that Russia faced down America and no longer feared it despite the sanctions 
the U.S. imposed on Russia. However, he contradicted himself by attacking Russia. On 
this point, the leader of ISIS used a new strategy of “religious emotion” to bring in 
recruits. He said,  
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we attacked by a crusade against Islam with the support of the leaders of some 
Arab and Islamic countries. We tried to establish an Islamic religious state, but 
they broke this dream. We must continue the jihad and revenge of this campaign 
against us (Al Baghdadi, 2018). 
 Al-Baghdadi directed part of his speech to the armed groups in Syria to gain 
support from these groups even though he had collided with them and executed their 
leaders. He found himself in an awkward position but had nothing to lose. The leader 
invited these groups to unite against America to restore confidence in ISIS. He warned 
against internal fighting and what he described as sedition. In contrast to his first speech, 
this leader of Isis revealed that he had become the leader of a group resembling the armed 
groups that deployed in Syria, rather than presenting himself as superior to these groups 
and threatening to slaughter them. At the end of the speech, Burke’s concept of 
identification figured prominently. Al-Baghdadi was seeking to unify rival groups. Al-
Baghdadi appealed to the soldiers of the armed opposition factions to "leave their 
traitorous leaders" and unite behind his leadership to confront enemies at home and 
abroad. He called on the extremist military factions to unite and warned against divisions 
that serve their enemies. 
 Al-Baghdadi appeared to prolong the speech, making it about 55 minutes long. 
The long duration of the speech reveals al-Baghdadi’s eagerness to persuade his 
followers to continue the armed rebellion. The invention was evident in the discourse, as 
al-Baghdadi became an analyst of the events that occurred in the caliphate he founded. 
Al-Baghdadi discussed the crusades and the Russian intervention in Syria, and he also 
presented a vision about the American state of mind, which was tired of fighting abroad, 
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and he expected its fall and demise. The timing of a speech is a crucial component of 
persuading an audience. This third speech was given on Eid al-Adha, an important 
religious holiday for Muslims; thus, insinuating religious overtones. As for the 
arrangement, arguments made through the speech were organized as religious sermons, 
containing an introduction to praise to God, followed by narrated arguments supported by 
the verses from the Quran. He ended with conclusions from his arguments. These are the 
methods that al-Baghdadi used as he made a persuasive argument. In one example, he 
expected America to retreat into itself using the statements of U.S. President Donald 
Trump when he declared his intention to withdraw from wars that do not appear to 
expire.  
 As for style, al-Baghdadi was keen to present the speech to stir the feelings of 
Muslims and noted for them that the dream of an Islamic state has fallen into the hands of 
the non-Muslim invaders. Al-Baghdadi invoked the history of righteous wars to arouse 
emotion and anger among Muslims. To support such memory, al-Baghdadi used a speech 
written on paper to ensure he delivered a coherent and coordinated recitation. This 55-
minute speech was the longest al-Baghdadi had given, and he used many verses of the 
Quran that are incredibly difficult to remember. Because the speech was audio and 
previously recorded, body language and other tools to affect the audience were 
unavailable to the speaker. However, he effectively used tone of voice changes as he 
moved through the changing arguments and positions. The emotion was evident in the 
voice. Al-Baghdadi used verses of the Qur’an in a beautiful voice to support his 
arguments, a classic type used by preachers in classical Islamic discourse. Al-Baghdadi 
again used the concept of identity, warning against division, and calling for small armed 
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groups to unite behind the organization. He also separated groups by describing the Arab 
fighters with the coalition as traitors and enemies. He called for nine bullets to fire at 
those he called traitors with one bullet for the international coalition.  
The Fourth Speech  
 In the last speech before his death, al-Baghdadi appeared in a video for the first 
time since his appearance at the Mosul mosque in 2014, five years earlier. The Isis 
organization published a propaganda video on its Telegram channel. In the video titled 
“In the hospitality of the Commander of the Faithful,” Al-Baghdadi was shown for 18 
minutes as lying on the ground next to others whose faces were hidden, and the leader of 
the organization appears with a long white beard and wearing a black handkerchief on his 
head. 
 The circumstances surrounding this speech were utterly different from past 
speeches. Al-Baghdadi announced the end of one battle of the war due to the fall of the 
city of Al-Baghouz in Syria as it had been the last stronghold of ISIS. There were reports 
of the ill health of al-Baghdadi in the confessions of his cousin Rabah Ali Al-Badri, who 
testified before the Iraqi judiciary about the extent of al-Baghdadi’s health problems. 
There were also reports of severe disagreements and splits within the organization. In 
response, al-Baghdadi made an appearance in the video to confirm his presence and 
ability to lead the organization in its most dangerous existential crises.  
 As previously, al-Baghdadi began the speech with the classic beginning of Islamic 
discourse, with praise to God and the Prophet Muhammad. In a turn of style, he 
continued the speech by acknowledging the defeat of the organization as a state, accusing 
the U.S. and the crusader states of waging war on them. Al-Baghdadi attacked the U.S. 
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by expressing, “Washington has sunk into the mud and declared its inability to protect its 
partners” (Al Baghdadi, 2019). Al-Baghdadi mentioned what he called the “empty 
promises” that Washington made to its allies, indicating that the U.S. will leave someday, 
and that victory, in the end, will favor those who were against cooperating with the U.S. 
Al-Baghdadi celebrated the half-decade of declaring the caliphate in 2014 and 
emphasized the point by repeating the phrase “half a decade since its establishment” 
about eight times. 
 ISIS referred to this new audio recording of al-Baghdadi under the title “Say and 
do,” which is a verse from the Qur’an urging work and diligence. The verse was used 
within the recording as consistent with the content of the speech. The phrase was used as 
part of the call to continue jihadist operations until the “supreme goal” of establishing a 
caliphate is met. Using these strategies, al-Baghdadi attempted to convince the followers 
that the organization remains focused on its primary goal, and the apparent defeat of the 
caliphate state was only temporary. In other words, he promoted the idea that the 
organization will overcome its losses by using the conviction that “it is a loss of a battle, 
not war;” (Al Baghdadi, 2019). al-Baghdadi framed the retreat as a temporary stage on 
the long road to victory.  
 In this context, al-Baghdadi used phrases that supported the meanings described 
above while continuously maintaining persuasive undercurrents in his speeches. By 
supporting that “The Khilafah state is crowding out nations, is on its way, certain of its 
victory,” (Al Baghdadi, 2019). he emphasized that the organization was still in existence, 
and reframed the current situation as an “expansion of ISIS and then the contraction . . . 
as a test from God.” The study of the history of ISIS does reflect its ability to overcome 
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losses and return to their goals. As in other speeches, al-Baghdadi appealed to his fighters 
and followers to continue the battles of attrition, and he reviewed the organization’s 
activity as he spoke about “The Battle of Sham” which means the battle of Syria that 
targeted eight countries. The operations reached about 92 skirmishes within four days. He 
also recited some details from what he called the “battle of attrition,” an operation 
targeting 11 countries. The number of military encounters reached 61 for three days. 
Additionally, there was the second battle of attrition that included a total of 152 
operations within ten days. Al-Baghdadi repeated his appeals, in the audio recording, to 
the fighters to redouble their efforts, stressing the necessity of continuing “attrition” 
operations on various fronts.  
 From this last speech, it becomes clear that al-Baghdadi and his organization have 
learned lessons from their defeats and previous battles. The geographical and military 
defeats suffered by the organization prompted it to adopt new tactics in the field of 
attrition warfare or guerrilla warfare. Al-Baghdadi realized that his geographical and 
military presence within expanses of land made it easier to target him. Therefore, he 
resorted to changing his tactics by directing surprise strikes to city security forces in weak 
areas while avoiding entering a decisive battle with the regular armies, thus, creating the 
“war of attrition.” 
 Al-Baghdadi welcomed recruits to the organization, noting that although the 
organization lost the battle, the recruits still flocked to the organization. This result shows 
that his speeches were succeeding because more young people were persuaded to join the 
organization. He welcomed what he called the delegations of recruits, but it was unclear 
whether he was referring to recruiting new people to join ISIS or pledging allegiance with 
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existing armed groups. For example, in July 2019, ISIS elements in Libya published a 
video clip to announce their renewed loyalty to al-Baghdadi. On June 18, 2019, the Boko 
Haram announced a renewed pledge of allegiance to al-Baghdadi and called on all 
Muslims to join the organization’s mandate. On June 22, 2019, a group of operatives 
calling themselves the East Asia Province announced that they would renew allegiance to 
al-Baghdadi and work under the banner of ISIS. According to the Egyptian Center for 
Thought and Strategic Studies, on June 26, 2019, ISIS members launched a video to 
declare allegiance to al-Baghdadi and renewed a pledge of allegiance under the name of 
the Caucasus Province. They also reported another group known as the Wilayat of 
Azerbaijan had declared allegiance to the ISIS Caliph on July 2, 2019.  
 To broaden religious divisions and rancor, Al-Baghdadi attacked the idols and 
gods of ignorance, which means non-Muslims. He warned against nationalism and 
democracy, describing these concepts as dangerous movements that contradict the 
principles of the Islamic religion. Al-Baghdadi attacked the international coalition against 
ISIS led by America and called it the crusade. He stated, "The battle of Islam and its 
people with the cross and its people is a long battle ... and there will be major 
repercussions." Using these words, he aimed to stir emotions of anger among Muslims. 
Al-Baghdadi called for the Arab countries participating in coalition with the West to be 
considered infidels who must be fought. Some of these countries, such as Saudi Arabia 
and Turkey, were named in the audio recording. This statement might have been an 
invitation to the organization’s members to carry out operations in those countries. 
 Al-Baghdadi called for jihad against Arab governments and labeled them as 
agents and disbelievers who did not defend other Muslims. He stated, "We tell them and 
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remind them that the only way to deal with these tyrants is by jihad in the cause of Allah" 
(Al-Baghdadi, 2019) .He encouraged the restoration of the dignity of Muslims as a reason 
to call for jihad against Arab governments by describing that "Jihad suppresses the 
tyrants, and with jihad, Muslims gain dignity, because these tyrants will only benefit the 
sword.” He then changed his style from calling for fighting and betraying Muslims to 
advising them as an Islamic leader. He remarked, "The Muslims have acted in legitimate 
ways to change regimes and tyrants, about jihad, and all religion should be for God" (Al-
Baghdadi, 2019).  Al-Baghdadi urged Muslims to wage jihad against governments rather 
than revolutions and demonstrations, the latter of which he described as futile. Burke 
(1969) argued that the creation of discord and division followed with the declaration of 
unity is a kind of persuasion through identification, and by then focusing on unity, the 
speaker could achieve the desired goal. 
 Al-Baghdadi demanded that his supporters regain his followers and their families 
by attacking the prisons and camps where they were being held. At that time, thousands 
of ISIS members were in overcrowded prisons in Iraq and Kurdish fighters’ control areas 
in northeastern Syria. These camps also housed tens of thousands of terrorist families 
who were Syrians, Iraqis, and foreigners. This phrase was his vow to avenge them, 
“Prisons, prisons, oh soldiers of the caliphate . . . your brothers and sisters in prisons, 
strive to rescue them and break the walls that cuff them” (Al-Baghdadi, 2019) He also 
called for targeting security personnel, investigators, and judges in prisons where ISIS 
members are located.  
 Al-Baghdadi addressed the women associated with the organization’s members 
and likened them to the mujahidin during the era of the Prophet Muhammad. He called 
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on them to be patient, persevere, and fight. Within the organization, women had diverse 
tasks as a part of their participation, from supporting husbands and raising a new 
generation of extremists, to working with propaganda and promoting the organization’s 
ideology and extremist ideas through social media. Furthermore, due to the military 
pressure on the organization and the loss of large numbers of fighters, ISIS had resorted 
to relying on women to conduct suicide operations during the battle of Mosul in Iraq and 
the battle of “Al-Baghouz” in Syria. 
 In summary, the fourth speech included raising the morale of ISIS members, 
given the frequent reports of the deteriorating health of al-Baghdadi, as well as the 
escalated discussion of an internal rift in the organization. Hence, al-Baghdadi 
deliberately issued this recording to attract and recruit new extremist individuals and 
groups, especially considering the group’s loss of many fighters and unifying the home 
front of the organization. The speech showed that al-Baghdadi continued developing a 
pattern in his speeches even after the defeat of the organization. To reframe their defeats, 
he turned to a different argument that the battles had been only part of a more 
comprehensive and ongoing war. He pointed out that ISIS had emerged after facing 
similar circumstances previously. He emphasized the success of establishing an Islamic 
state despite these difficult circumstances. In its arrangement, the speech began with the 
classic religious introduction, which is the praise of God and then the Prophet 
Muhammad. Al-Baghdadi refuted the rumors of his death and arguments that the 
organization had disbanded by stating that ISIS had lost a battle but not the war. Al-
Baghdadi tried to remind followers of the organization’s previous circumstances. He 
concluded by directing his appeals to sympathizers to launch separate retaliatory attacks 
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against the countries that participated in the coalition. He also directed calls to attack the 
prisons where the organization’s elements reside to liberate its elements. 
 The style of speech was embellished and elaborated; he used classical Arabic as 
usual with his calls supported by verses from the Qur’an and the sayings of the Prophet. 
These characteristics of the discourse reflected his religious background and 
qualifications to lead the organization. The patterns in speech content included reciting 
statements declaring that the organization would not be broken and would persist. The 
speech was like a military statement in which it was keen to show the facts on the ground. 
By using religious vocabulary persuasively, al-Baghdadi suggested that God had 
commanded ISIS to fight on, and therefore the members must fulfill God’s commands. 
The tone of the speech was serious about motivating the elements of the organization not 
to surrender and continue the resistance. He used rises and falls in the volume of his 
voice to entrain the audience’s attention and maintain an emotional timbre. Al-Baghdadi 
preserved efficiently pronouncing difficult words and Quranic verses. Although al-
Baghdadi’s language was ornamental, he was precise with no hesitation or stutter, 
suggesting that he was reading the message from a written version. Overall, al-Baghdadi 
appeared quite prepared and well-practiced to deliver the speech . 
 To summarize this exploration of all four speeches, the four speeches showed al-
Baghdadi's ability to exploit the conditions that the group has passed to mobilize support 
and stir division through intimidation and incitement. The speeches also revealed al-
Baghdadi's determination to retain his extremist religious ideology even as he lost all the 
territory under the group’s control. Despite losses, he continued calls for retaliation 
against the countries participating in the coalition. The first speech was quite different 
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from others because he declared a caliphate state and established the new state as the 
head of the religious state without commenting on the international circumstances 
surrounding it. The other three speeches were different from the first because these 
contained common factors, such as the call for jihad, fighting, non-surrender, 
steadfastness, and crusades. In these last three speeches, al-Baghdadi exploited emotions 
of anger, pride, and fear to recruit fighters who would not surrender easily. The call for 
fighters motivated in this way prolonged the battles and maximized civilian casualties. In 
all speeches, Al-Baghdadi was keen to show himself as a military leader who could rally 
enthusiasm among the fighters. Despite the suffering of al-Baghdadi and the losses of the 
organization, he continued to be seen in public, regularly give enthusiastic speeches so 
that it was clear that he was still alive.  
 In his first speech, Al-Baghdadi appeared publicly for the first time in Friday 
sermon, announcing a religious caliphate. Al-Baghdadi seemed confident about the 
success of his country, and his speech was balanced. The second and third speeches were 
lengthy audio recordings, and in the fourth speech, he used video showing himself sitting 
with a group of masked men. All al-Baghdadi's speeches appeared during Muslim 
religious seasons such as Friday prayers, Ramadan, and holidays to influence and evoke 
the cause such that he could mobilize recruits. 
 Research question summary. 
RQ1: What are the persuasive elements and arguments on which al-Baghdadi’s 
rhetoric was based?  
As a cleric, Al-Baghdadi incorporated into his speeches the emotional calls and 
slogans that mimic the religious appeals and invitations as used in the Qur’an. These calls 
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and slogans were intended to give more power and influence to his rhetoric. This 
intention was evident in all his speeches; for example, he used phrases such as “O 
Muslims worshipers of God, the youth of Islam, brothers of Islam, the mujahideen, and 
you who believe.” He used plural forms in his speeches, often used in rhetorical practice 
by extremist Muslims such as Osama bin Laden. Clear speech, and speaking in the plural 
form of Islamic discourses is a classic approach that has been imitated in all religious 
discourses up to the current day. For example, in the first speech, Al-Baghdadi stated, 
All praise is due to Allah. We thank him and seek His assistance and His 
forgiveness. O Allah, defend us from the evil of ourselves and the evils of our 
actions. Whoever is guided by Allah will never be misguided, and whoever is 
made lost by Allah will never be guided (Al Baghdadi, 2014). 
Al-Baghdadi’s essential focus was on building credibility as a cleric, preacher, 
and expert in complex Islamic teachings. He emphasized virtuous morals by invoking 
verses and hadiths that encourage virtues, such as fasting, jihad, charity, as well as raising 
slogans in defense of weaker Muslims, reviving the Islamic caliphate, and restoring the 
dignity of Muslims. From the Arab and Islamic world’s social perspectives, presenting 
the impression of religiosity and honesty is crucial to creating legitimacy for the speaker, 
thus facilitating the persuasion process. In some situations, Al-Baghdadi directly 
appealed to the people regarding the necessity of establishing an Islamic state and Islamic 
law as the framework for this state. Al-Baghdadi used these types of slogans since the 
establishment of his jihad movement. For example, in the first speech, he proclaimed,  
O people, the religion of Allah, blessed be He, is not established and this goal for 
which Allah created us is not achieved but by empowering the Shariah of Allah 
 
101 
and being judged by it and establishing the restrictions, and this is only done with 
power and authority.” This is the establishment of the religion: A Book that 
guides and a sword that supports. (Al Baghdadi, 2014) 
Al-Baghdadi also used Islamic cultural symbols, such as the sword, which is a symbol of 
strength and a reminder of the past glories of Muslims during the era of the Islamic 
empire. These are compelling messages for Muslims that are not easy to ignore. 
In the first speech, Al-Baghdadi focused on building a credible personality among 
Muslims. He portrayed himself as a cleric who did not want the presidency and described 
the country he founded as different from the Arab regimes. Al-Baghdadi stressed that he 
was chosen for the role by ordinary Muslims and not as a self-imposed leader. Al-
Baghdadi considered leading the state to be a difficult task that must be accomplished for 
Muslims’ sake. 
Al-Baghdadi was also keen to raise the slogans of social justice and anti-
corruption by reminding all that he was an average man chosen by others to rule, fight 
corruption, achieve social justice, and a fair distribution of wealth. His calls were linked 
to Islamic law, specifically to the return to the old Islamic system from the days of the 
Prophet Muhammad. The promises and appeals were effective because he linked them to 
the Qur’an. The usefulness of the appeals was especially apparent after chaos struck the 
Middle East, and the Arab system failed. Through slogans, virtuous expressions, and 
displays of Islamic morals, Al-Baghdadi presented an alternative for creating a successful 
Islamic empire that could last for centuries.  
In the remaining three speeches dominated by the conflict between the 
international coalition forces and the Isis organization, Al-Baghdadi focused on slogans 
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of revenge, patience, and jihad. He stressed the goal of building a comprehensive Islamic 
regime. However, at the time of the last three speeches, the political and social 
atmospheres were dominated by the conflict between the international coalition forces 
and the Isis organization. Al-Baghdadi shifted focused to slogans of revenge, patience, 
and jihad, and stressed forming a fulsome Islamic regime. However, the enemies came 
and destroyed the project. Consequently, Al-Baghdadi’s focus was on retaliation and 
implementing retaliatory terrorist acts in the coalition countries. Al-Baghdadi raised 
slogans related to the struggle between truth and falsehood and between Islam and 
infidelity. These slogans, in particular, provoke anger among Muslims.  
Notably, Al-Baghdadi relied on integrating the slogans of religious and emotional 
calls, promises of reform, and fighting corruption and injustice. He used these in the 
second, third, and fourth speeches as significant elements of persuasion. In general, the 
religious appeals adopted by Al-Baghdadi may be decisive in persuading, given that the 
Arab and Islamic societies are conservative, and many hardliners and moderates believed 
that the Islamic state is the solution to their problems. Al-Baghdadi relied on these 
elements frequently in his speeches. 
 RQ2: How did al-Baghdadi exploit the interpretations of the Qur’anic text to 
support his arguments?  
The appeals that Al-Baghdadi relied on were linked to verses of the Qur’an and 
hadiths of the Prophet. These phrases were aimed to take advantage of young Muslims’ 
ignorance of interpretations of the Qur’an and exploit the many variations of these 
interpretations. For example, he used verses calling for jihad and defending Islam linked 
to stories during the reign of the Prophet Muhammad 1,400 years ago. Al-Baghdadi 
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relied on intensifying the use of Qur’an verses to strengthen his arguments and convince 
more young Muslims to join him. The goal of the persuasion was to give legitimacy to a 
nascent Islamic state. The Qur’an contains 6,348 verses, all of which have multiple 
interpretations; however, Al-Baghdadi focused on the verses that call for jihad, fighting, 
and sacrifice for Islam, as these existed 1,400 years ago.  
 In the Islamic literature and the Arab and Muslim social perspectives, whoever 
kills while struggling for God's sake will enter Heaven, and they remain alive with God. 
This is not an analysis but a fact found in the Qur’an and the hadiths of the Prophet 
Muhammad. The words are “who was killed while striving for the sake of God is not 
dead. Rather, he is alive with God and has paradise.”  
There is a verse in the Qur’an that urges fighting the polytheists. This verse has been used 
by extremists to justify their motives. Al-Baghdadi used the idea in most of his speeches, 
such as “fight all the polytheists as they all fight you, and know that God is with the 
righteous.” Similarly, he used, “Go forth light and heavy, and strive with your money and 
yourselves for the sake of God.” Furthermore, he included, “God has given the 
Mujahideen a great reward over the rest.”  
 Moreover, there are many hadiths about the Prophet Muhammad discussing the 
merits of jihad, and it is the best of deeds; for example, “He said: I said: O Messenger of 
God, which work is better?” Prophet Muhammad said, “Faith in God, and jihad for His 
cause.” All these verses in the Qur’an and the hadith of the Prophet Muhammad are 
related to events of 1400 years ago and have little to do with today. Nevertheless, 
extremists such as Al-Baghdadi continue to use these verses to recruit Muslims into the 
organization's ranks. He emphasizes and repeats these verses to frame the recruits as 
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jihadists in the cause of God and portray that they will enter eternal paradise if they are 
killed. These details illustrate why there is no surprise when Muslim youths blow 
themselves up for the sake of eternal life in the eternal paradise. 
 In general, the verses of the Qur’an and the hadiths of the Prophet were crucial in 
recruiting and persuading Muslim youth around the world. Al-Baghdadi linked these 
verses with the pretext of creating a pure Islamic state, but the enemies came and 
destroyed the Muslim project. Therefore, for these extremists, the destruction is evidence 
of the legitimacy of the fight because opposition attacked and occupied Muslim lands.  
 RQ3: How al-Baghdadi does exploit the concept of identity to persuade thousands 
of young Muslims? 
 Al-Baghdadi took advantage of the concept of Islamic identity, a useful element 
in influencing the targeted youth, by declaring in his first sermon that his country would 
champion vulnerable Muslims and restore the dignity of the Islamic nation. He did not 
recognize the existing Arab nations and regimes and described them as agents. Using the 
model of the Prophet Muhammad and his successful Islamic State of 1400 years ago, Al-
Baghdadi painted in the minds of young people an Islamic State like that of the Prophet 
Muhammad as a solution for Muslims' problems.  
 In his speeches, Al-Baghdadi placed Muslims in one category and non-Muslims 
in another, exaggerating the division between these two groups and strengthening the 
similarity and sympathy within the Muslim group. He declared that one of the pillars of 
his movement is restoring Muslims' dignity, defending vulnerable Muslims, and the 
withdrawing Muslims from the enemy Western countries. Strengthening Islamic identity 
was not an invention of Al-Baghdadi; the notion is abundantly present in Islamic 
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literature. The verses of the Qur’an are addressed to Muslims as a community because the 
Qur’an and the Prophet Muhammad view Muslims as a nation. There is no difference 
between their rich and poor, and there are no differences in color. All are equal; the only 
difference is the degree of godliness. For example, the Prophet Muhammad said, “The 
believers in their mutual kindness, compassion and sympathy are just like one body. 
When one of the limbs suffers, the whole body responds to it with wakefulness and 
fever.” Also, the Prophet Muhammad said, “The relationship of the believer with another 
believer is like (the bricks of) a building, each strengthens the other.” He illustrated this 
by interlacing the fingers of both his hands. 
 Al-Baghdadi knows that there is confusion in understanding the Islamic identity 
within the Islamic and Arab world, as many Muslims believe that states' borders are 
temporary and that affiliation must be based on the Islamic religion and not on a 
homeland. Extremist organizations, including the Muslim Brotherhood, do not believe in 
borders. They believe in a cross-border identity. In his first speech, Al-Baghdadi used the 
famous cultural Islamic symbols, which is the month of Ramadan, in which all Muslims 
fast in worship to God and abide by many common religious customs. Moreover, in 
Islamic literature, Ramadan is considered a symbol of goodness and unity and a reminder 
of the Prophet Muhammad and others' Islamic victories. Al-Baghdadi succeeded in 
creating a common unity with Muslims by revering the cultural symbols in Islam.  In his 
third and fourth speeches, Al-Baghdadi appealed to Muslims and militant groups to unite 
under the organization's banner because division means the enemies’ control over the 
capabilities of Muslims. Jihad is one of the most important cultural symbols in the 
Islamic identity that Al-Baghdadi uses in his speeches. Historically, Muslims proudly 
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view the Islamic empire that their forefathers established through jihad and Islam's 
spread.  
 Al-Baghdadi took advantage of the youth’s thirst for a comprehensive Islamic 
project that eliminated borders, restored the Islamic empire and the caliphate, and 
presented an Islamic project's nucleus under Islamic law. The state should have a socialist 
character and provide free education, healthcare, and fight corruption. It aimed to attract 
militants and convince the hesitant who seek a comprehensive Islamic state that includes 
all under one Islamic entity.  
 Al-Baghdadi believed that the caliphate project was the duty of every Muslim to 
participate in it. Al-Baghdadi clarified that this duty had been lost for centuries, and 
Muslims must now be swift and participate in this movement. “This duty is upon 
Muslims – it is a duty lost for centuries, and absent from the world's reality, and many 
Muslims were ignorant of it. The Muslims sin by losing their duty, and they must seek to 
establish it, and they have done so, and all praise is due to Allah (Al Baghdadi, 2014). 
Generally, Muslims believe that the Islamic nation is the best in principles, values, and 
beliefs, and therefore, there are questions about why there is a lack of a comprehensive 
Islamic state such as that which Al-Baghdadi created. Therefore, he expounded that the 
project must be supported according to his perspective. The coalition’s attack against Al-
Baghdadi’s state was an attack on the significant Islamic project, and therefore, deserved 
to be answered and retaliated. These were the calls made by Al-Baghdadi in his more 




 – DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
The dissertation explored the rhetorical and persuasive methods used by Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi in his speeches, which targeted the Islamic nations. Central to the 
purpose was to examine Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's success in persuading thousands of 
young people around the world to join his extremist Islamic state.  He also cited the 
Qur'an in the face of  controversy surrounding interpretations of the verses and the lack of 
a unified interpretation. Furthermore, Al-Baghdadi used verses of the Qur’an to support 
his rhetorical argument. The use of these verses is important for completing the 
persuasion process as part of al-Baghdadi's use of social media to reach wider audiences, 
such as any protest or extremist movements. Using Aristotle's rhetorical methodology, 
the discursive concept of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the theory of social identity, and Burke's 
concept of identification, the analysis focused on four speeches of this leader of ISIS. In 
this process, the key appeals of al-Baghdadi were described, and the ways he used them 
were highlighted. Al-Baghdadi took advantage of the tragic situation in Arab countries 
after the wave of revolutions during the Arab Spring, which revealed the despair of the 
youth, the state of poverty, and the infighting in Syria and Iraq. Al-Baghdadi presented a 
vision for an Islamic state based on social justice and the distribution of wealth among 
the youth, with free education and healthcare. Al-Baghdadi promised a state free from 
corruption, favoritism, and taxes. Al-Baghdadi addressed unifying Muslim sentiments by 
reviving the Islamic Caliphate, restoring the dignity of the Islamic nation, and defending 
vulnerable Muslims worldwide. He wagered on the success of his project using the 
fundamentalist Islamic religion. He called for non-reliance on Western countries and 
boycotting them and outright fighting them at certain times. The arguments revealed how 
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al-Baghdadi transformed from a state leader to a “gangster,” as he tried to create division 
between Muslims and others--particularly between non-Muslims and those enemies who 
committed genocide against Muslims.  
Forms of Islamic Rhetoric  
Rhetoric in the Arab world revolved around spinning, love, mourning, pride in 
lineage, and praise; the spin was successful. However, after the emergence of Islam, the 
revelation of the Qur’an, and the establishment of a comprehensive Islamic system, 
Arabic rhetoric was affected by the many calls of the Qur’an, the hadith of the Prophet 
Muhammad, and new Islamic slogans. The Qur’an and the Prophet’s hadiths fostered an 
unprecedented intellectual and social revolution. The rhetorical style of the Qur’an was 
powerful as it contained stories, warnings, appeals, consequences, invitations, and other 
aspects of rhetoric. Therefore, it was logical that the Arabic language was affected by this 
intellectual revolution. Islamic discourse flourished in an unheralded way; the discourse 
was moderate, and poems of praise, satire, and spinning flourished. Weekly Friday 
sermons were an intellectual, political, and religious platform where the Prophet was 
diligent in establishing Islam based on social justice and paying zakat. The zakat 
represents symbolic sums withdrawn from the rich and distributed to the poor every year 
its one Pillars of Islam. The fasting and Hajj, which are cultural symbols that came with 
Islam, were significantly affected by the Islamic discourse. The tribes eventually attacked 
the Prophet Muhammad; thus, he had no choice but to defend his project by calling for 
jihad among his enthusiastic companions and tribes, and they supported the Islamic 
project by participating with him.  
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Consequently, Arabic rhetoric was affected by these historical and significant 
events. However, recently, radical movements have appeared and have used classical 
Islamic discourses to revive the old Islamic empire and Islamic identity through jihad. 
They favor abolishing the existing Arab and Islamic regimes and fighting the infidels. 
Moreover, these extremist organizations are trying to influence the Islamic discursive 
scene by mentioning the old jihadist stories and creating enthusiastic chants similar to 
singing but without music. These chants threaten the opponents of their project, fuel 
feelings, and link the project to the era of the Prophet Muhammad 1400 years ago. In 
contrast, moderate Islamic discourse is unique and comprehensive. The moderate 
discourse takes place weekly, on holidays, and during the Hajj season to follow the 
Islamic system, correct mistakes, and develop Islamic ideas for the modern era. 
Extremist rhetoric in Islam. Jihad and its urging are considered one of the most 
crucial extremist discourses in the literature. Using this content, extremists support a 
Western conspiracy that seeks to divide Muslims, tamper with their capabilities, and 
provoke division. Similar to Al-Baghdadi, the followers of jihadist discourse believe in 
an Islamic nation. They consider the Arab and Islamic countries and the borders to be 
Western “plans.” According to their discourse, these countries and borders have 
contributed to divisions within the Islamic nation. If the Islamic nation was unified, it 
becomes a real threat to the West. Therefore, their most important goal is attaining the 
caliphate; however, not everyone who adopts the goal of establishing one Islamic nation 
or the caliphate's restoration is extremist. There are hadiths about the Prophet Muhammad 
that state that the Islamic Caliphate will return at the end of time. 
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Consequently, those upholding the discourse of one Islamic state believe that the 
time has come to revive the caliphate and fulfill the promise of the Prophet Muhammad. 
This discourse exploits the enthusiastic youth who are revolting against Arab regimes, 
corruption, and unemployment. The discourse presents an inclusive, alternative, and 
successful Islamic goal, as during the Prophet Muhammad's era. The Arabic language 
was influenced by Islamic rhetoric and Aristotle’s rhetorical approach. Merging of 
culture and other traditions with a quasi-socialist vision for the administration of a system 
based on Islamic identity is, of course, an influential and unprecedented methodology. In 
my opinion, it is a methodology closer to an ideological approach. 
Extremist rhetoric and the Qu’ran. Al-Baghdadi rarely deviated from the classic 
Islamic rhetoric employed by al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. Social media, which 
was not available during the time of Osama bin Laden, was used to spread al-Baghdadi's 
speeches and principles. Al-Baghdadi used verses of the Quran extensively to support 
arguments in these speeches. Al-Baghdadi's speeches carried the same ideas that bin 
Laden and the Prophet Muhammad did, such as uniting the Islamic nation, helping 
Muslims, restoring lost dignity, and creating a system of free social services for people. 
The dream of the Islamic Empire was the motive for establishing the state of al-Baghdadi 
and Al-Qaeda. 
Al-Baghdadi and extremist heritage. Al-Baghdadi viewed the ancient heritage as 
an uncomfortable element, and he believed it to represent a non-Islamic cultural 
symbolism. Thus, he established an Islamic state that contradicted the older heritage and 
cultural symbols such as statues. His state was based on some hadiths of the Prophet 
Muhammad that prohibited the possession of such statues. In general, Al-Baghdadi 
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wanted to create a new Islamic culture and establish this country's heritage. The ancient 
heritage was seen as a symbol of non-Muslims, and thus, he demolished all the statues 
and sold many of them. Consistently, all extremist Islamic movements have viewed the 
old heritage as a form of suspicion and threat, and it is impermissible to preserve it. 
Al-Baghdadi designed objectives in these speeches to focus on the declaration of 
the Islamic Caliphate State. Therefore, he swayed the audience using Islamic identity as a 
weapon of persuasion. The intent was to gain audience loyalty to the concept of a 
powerful state by describing it as having many resources and ways to achieve its goals. A 
second appeal was to convince the young Muslims of the necessity of jihad and call upon 
them to join and support this new state by supporting it financially and promoting its 
ideas and principles. 
Social media and extreme persuasion. Al-Baghdadi realized that his extremist 
religious ideology is not welcome on traditional media, and to confront this problem, he 
relied heavily on publishing his activities on social media, and he succeeded in reaching a 
wider audience by translating his religious ideas and speeches into several languages 
around the world. Incredibly, no speech was given on television or radio channels; 
instead, al-Baghdadi relied on social media, and in an unparalleled way, he spread the 
speeches and ideas around the world. In the process, the group established a news agency 
and a magazine interested in spreading Baghdadi’s ideas. Al-Baghdadi succeeded in 
recruiting thousands of young people worldwide, and his messages reached 110 
countries, as cited by the U.S. counterterrorism envoy. As the following grew, ISIS 
stepped up its propaganda campaign in an unprecedented way. Publicity campaigns 
varied using video and audio recordings and quick messages. ISIS’s propaganda 
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campaigns included mass executions, suicide bombings, and sniper operations for ISIS 
enemies. However, Isis was keen to highlight its soft image by publishing promotional 
videos that included celebrations with children on holidays, distributing financial and 
cash subsidies to low-income families, treating patients, and opening new schools. All 
these campaigns included images of the leader of Isis and audio excerpts from his famous 
sermon. They also established government headquarters under old Islamic names 
(Revkin, 2016). Social media has therefore been a crucial element in spreading the 
extremist al-Baghdadi movement, which is still active today despite his death in 2019. 
The first video produced in high quality was entitled “Islamic State News.” The 
report was a message to strengthen ISIS’s position on social media; the report was 
translated into English to target non-Arabic-speaking Muslims (Berger, 2015). Members 
of the ISIS of different nationalities began publishing tweets promoting ISIS’s image on 
the social networking site, Twitter, under the title “Mujahid Diary.” The Russian, 
German, and French languages were also frequently used on the accounts of ISIS 
members, which meant expanding the publicity process and using sophisticated 
techniques to recruit more fighters (Nico, 2014). Religious ideology was not the only 
motivating factor in the speeches. Al-Baghdadi has also promised a stable and robust 
country by fighting corruption, giving free health care, free education, and other benefits 
that attracted thousands of young people worldwide. 
Many Western countries, including the United States, have acknowledged the 
failure of their efforts to counter the Isis campaign on social networking sites. Because of 
ISIS’ expansion of social networking sites such as Twitter, YouTube, and Telegram, 
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Western and Arab governments have struggled but failed to repel these campaigns 
(Berger & Morgan, 2015). 
Twitter monitored more than 90 thousand accounts sympathetic to the ISIS 
organization. According to the website, 120,000 accounts were suspended on their 
website sympathizing with ISIS. One of the reasons for the failure of the counter-
campaign is that Isis used several languages to spread his professional propaganda 
(Berger & Morgan, 2016).  
ISIS’s propaganda targets a dedicated group of young people both in the Arab 
regions and in western countries. ISIS’s organization in its rhetoric focuses on young 
people in general, but it targets the rebellious young man who is angry about Society, 
who has lost his identity and feels isolated. 
Identification and social identity in al-Baghdadi’s rhetoric. Regarding identity, I 
find that most Arabs and Muslims are experiencing an identity crisis, especially in Arab 
culture. Furthermore, there is a malingering conflict between the advocates of Arab 
nationalism, as adopted and promoted by Gamal Abdel Nasser Nasser against those who 
are engaged in a significant project to reach out to the advocates of Islamic identity. 
There are the majority who consider religious identity and beliefs as an ideal framework 
for the Arab and Islamic world. This approach advocated by those such as Nassar refers 
to the Qur’an and the hadiths as primary to Islamic unity. The moral underpinnings 
include beliefs such as there is no difference between the rich and the poor, and those 
with different skin colors or ethnic heritage–all are equal with God. The advocates of 
Arab nationalism say the Arabic language is the language of the Qur’an, and the Prophet 
Muhammad is the Arab Prophet; therefore, Arab nationalism existed before the 
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emergence of the Islamic call and the Prophet Muhammad. Nationalists believe that Arab 
nationalism must be separate from the Islamic identity in its entirety and its geographical 
extension. They hold that Arab identity and national allegiance do not necessarily clash 
with an Islamic identity.  
However, conflicts lie mostly with Muslim intellectuals who consider the Arab 
identity racist because it appears founded on ethnic or racial bloodlines; Islam forbids 
such thinking. Ethnic minorities in Arab and Muslim countries, such as Yazidis, 
Christians, and Kurds, suffer from the problem of confusion about identity. Al-Baghdadi 
claimed to create an Islamic framework that embraced all identities and focused on the 
reverence of cultural and Islamic symbols such as Ramadan and Islamic unity. Crucially, 
he concentrated on the idea of creating one Islamic nation as a fundamentalist Islamic 
system similar to that adopted by Muslims during the era of the Prophet Muhammad. The 
advocates of Islamic identity believe that the Ottoman Empire is the best evidence 
showing the success of endeavors explicitly aimed for Muslims.  
On the theoretical side, researchers who study rhetoric have asserted that 
rhetorical criticism should not “serve” scientific theory because rhetoric and its 
understanding is an art in itself. Nevertheless, I found that ’Burke’s concept is consistent 
with Al-Baghdadi's rhetorical practice of persuasion, and Burke Suggestion my 
understanding. For example, Al-Baghdadi’s focus on creating common ground with the 
public by revering the Islamic symbols and presenting as a virtuous fundamentalist cleric 
is consistent with tenets of Burke’s rhetoric analysis. Al-Baghdadi stands in contrast to 
the corrupt and indolent leaders of Arab regimes. For instance, Al-Baghdadi realized that 
wearing a turban and appearing similar to the Prophet Muhammad, significantly impacted 
 
115 
the masses. He used the turban symbolically to connect the masses to the era of the 
Prophet Muhammad and the Islamic Caliphate. Al-Baghdadi succeeded in broadening the 
divide between Muslims and non-Muslims. Again, this strategy was endorsed by Burke, 
who the approach as an influence on the masses. By nature, people are thirsty to compete 
in their surroundings in their culture and with other cultures and groups. As stipulated by 
Burke concepts, competition creates divisions among people. As attempted by Al-
Baghdadi in the third and fourth speeches, the unifying of groups was promoted by 
calling on armed groups to unite to defeat the coalition. He reminded the masses of the 
Qur’an in which it is said, “Do not provoke strife because it leads to failure.” Al-
Baghdadi warned of the danger of internal conflicts within armed groups because they 
gift their enemies.  
Social identity theory was also a part of the rhetoric; the theory states that people 
usually exaggerate the similarities within groups while exaggerating the differences 
between groups. People sympathize with the groups to which they belong. Al-Baghdadi 
succeeded in using these concepts by categorizing Muslims in a group distinct from non-
Muslims. He exaggerated the similarities within the Islamic community using verses 
from the Qur’an and the hadith of the Prophet Muhammad. Moreover, Al-Baghdadi built 
a framework on the divisions between Muslims and others and called on Muslims to 
leave Arab lands and join his Islamic movement. He promised to restore the dignity, the 
honor of an Islamic nation, and the defense of weak Muslims worldwide. These 
theoretical concepts provide a logical explanation for Al-Baghdadi's rhetoric, although 
rhetorical criticism is not usually associated with scientific theories. Aristotle's 
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methodology, Jamal Abdel Nasser’s rhetorical concept, the concept of identity, and the 
theory of social identity succeeded in deconstructing al-Baghdadi's rhetoric.  
Theoretical implications of extremist rhetoric. The conclusions of the study 
emphasize that Al-Baghdadi exploited the misery of the youth, their thirst for a new 
social order, and the desire to build an economically and militarily strong Islamic empire. 
In his speeches, al-Baghdadi blended emotional and religious appeals and verses of the 
Qur’an, conferring religious legitimacy on his state. These appeals mainly motivated 
religious youth in Islamic countries. Religious and extremist groups focus on persuading 
youths regarding factors common within their groups, thus, stimulating social identity by 
emphasizing the divide between us and them. More precisely, social identities can play a 
decisive role in wars, conflicts, and spark protest movements, as we see today, such as 
the Black Lives Matter movement that focuses on the injustice toward the Black race. 
The ISIS organization succeeded in operating schools and hospitals, restoring electricity 
and services in the areas it controls, thus, creating a free and straightforward social 
system for people, unlike other systems. Extremist Islamic movements are no longer 
against societies, but can administer the sites they control and provide free services to the 
communities. Social media contributed to sparking protest movements around the world. 
Al-Baghdadi's movement relied on social media to communicate his ideas to a wide 
range of Muslims—and even non-Muslims--worldwide. 
Identity and resisting extremism. To develop a policy to combat extremism, the 
starting point should be identity issues; if identity is foremost, then leaders can use it as a 
positive force to open further possibilities of recruitment (Isiah, 2016). Overall, al-
Baghdadi focused on the cross-border identity of the Islamic Ummah, abolishing all 
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cultural identities and religious pluralism in the Middle East and making the Islamic 
identity critical. To combat this extremist discourse, researchers should find other ways to 
enact or define identity and promote an alternative means for cross-border identity; 
however, it may mean confining Arab nationalism to the borders of a state. Arab 
governments must meet the aspirations of young people, create jobs for them, work to 
fight corruption, and fight unemployment to eliminate extremism. In addition, Muslim 
scholars must find a unified and clear interpretation of the Qur’an that is taught in schools 
in all Muslim countries to prevent tampering with interpretations of the Qur’an. It is also 
important to find a strategy that prevents terrorist and extremist organizations from 
accessing social media and using them to spread their malicious ideas. The Security 
Council must find a just solution to the five-decade-old Palestinian-Israeli conflict; the 
Sunni and Shiite extremist organizations use the Palestinian cause as a symbol of 
injustice to remind Muslims of the failure of political solutions and the lack of 
seriousness of the West in resolving Muslim issues. Teachers in the Muslim world should 
develop educational curricula that include lessons of tolerance and emphasize eradicating 
books that include isolation and hatred. There is a need to find a moderate and counter 
persuasive discourse that addresses the identity issues raised by extremist rhetoric. To 
create a moderate discourse, tradition dictates that clerics become involved. This tradition 
derives from an ancient Islamic legacy that supports a need for an intellectual review to 
understand others as human beings and not as competitors. Islamic clerics should remind 
people that Muslims are not better than others and that non-Muslims share in humanity. It 
is also a problem to continue dividing people into Muslims and non-Muslims. Pushing 
people to embrace multiple identities is the best solution to prevent isolationism and 
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fanaticism against each other (Sen, 2006). Because of Muslim’s faith in the Qur'an and 
the Prophet Muhammad, it is possible to rely on some verses of the Qur'an that call for 
tolerance as a rationale for creating moderate speech.  
In sum, moderate rhetoric could use identification in non-extremist ways to 
encourage an audience to identify with their homeland and within the borders of one 
state, and identify with prosocial aspects of Islam or other social movements across 
nation-states. The use of this rhetoric would also promote individuals’ identities and 
strengthen the coexistence of diverse cultures in the Islamic world. An outstanding 
feature of the Islamic world is that there are dozens of cultures, races, and sects. 
Communities of Muslims should encourage cultural pluralism and tolerance among 
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